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Abstract 
This paper sheds light on the communication process through which experts and decision makers integrate their 
domain specific knowledge in decision making situations and argues for the benefit of software-supported visu-
alization of contributions. Understanding both decision making and knowledge integration as communicative 
processes, we present a short review of literature on the concept of knowledge integration. Based on this review, 
we present a model for knowledge integration and discuss an experimental study which provides a first empirical 
evaluation of the model. In the proposed model, knowledge integration is reflected by the resolution of four 
conversational challenges – equal participation, big picture thinking, establishing common ground, and construc-
tive conflict. We argue that the modality of the conversation impacts on the importance of the single elements of 
knowledge integration. We show that – when supporting conversations with an interactive visualization tool –- 
conversation partners rely more on the construction of the big picture and of the common ground, and less on 
conflict and equal participation. Furthermore, the handling of conflict is more constructive than in the non-
supported situation. An experimental study tests and confirms both the model for knowledge integration and the 
moderation effect of the use of the interactive visual tool.  
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Introduction and Background 
In the last decades knowledge has become ever more specialized and distributed. The 
distribution of expertise has profound implications for the coordination and integration 
mechanisms across knowledge boundaries (Brusoni et al., 2001; Grant, 1996a). In decision 
making, in order to cope with the uncertainties of fast changing market environments and with 
the growing complexity of (organizational) problems and solutions, decision makers gather 
specialists from various domains pertinent to the decision to take. This paper focuses on how 
specialized knowledge is integrated in decision making, by analyzing the communications 
between domain experts and decision makers. It aims, on the one hand, to elicit crucial com-
municative challenges that arise when aiming to integrate specialized knowledge. In doing so, 
we approach knowledge integration from a communicative perspective and present a reflective 
model for knowledge integration. A second aim of the paper is to discuss the role of collabo-
rative visual software tools in supporting the integration of knowledge in decision making. We 
present a first empirical evaluation of both the model for knowledge integration and the impact 
of the use of a collaborative visual tool on the basis of a class experiment.  
A communicative perspective on knowledge is based on the belief that human knowl-
edge is developed, created and integrated in social interaction (Berger & Luckman, 1966; 
Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995) and that communication is the main form of how people interact 
with each other. In this way, we can understand knowledge processes to be communication 
processes. As a consequence, studying communicative patterns, practices, and challenges 
sharpens the understanding of the way people create and integrate knowledge. A communica-
tive perspective as we pursue it – that is focusing on co-located, face-to-face conversations – 
does not focus on macro aspects of the knowledge integration process. The integration of spe-
cialized knowledge in decision making is bound to a variety of organizational and political 
constellations (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Swan & Scarbrough, 2005). Power struggles and 
the pursuit of personal interests might even lead to instances in which specialized knowledge 
is either deliberately not considered, or only said to be taken into account.  
There are specific requirements for conversations apt to integrate knowledge in deci-
sion making. The aim of knowledge integration is to maintain or even foster a functional de-
gree of specialization, while being able to combine and apply this highly specialized knowl-
edge into joint actions and decisions (Eisenhardt & Santos, 2000). This is in contrast to a logic 
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of knowledge ‘transfer’ (Szulanski, 2000) where knowledge gaps should be minimized. As 
such, knowledge integration requires the synthesis of individuals’ disparate specialized knowl-
edge into situation-specific systemic knowledge without extensive communication or transfer 
of that knowledge (Alavi & Tiwana, 2002: 1031; Grant, 1996a). In addition, the creation of 
new meaning and knowledge is intrinsic to the process of knowledge integration. When inter-
acting, the insights of various specialists are combined and “generated in” a new context and 
are not to simply exchanged or transferred (Cook & Brown, 1999: 388). As a consequence, 
knowledge integration requires synthetic modes of communication, which yet can represent in 
an adequate manner the complexity of the issue of decision. Also, integration requires modes 
of communication, which allow for transcending the knowledge boundaries that exist among 
communication partners. The concept of ‘knowledge boundary’ refers to the idea that people 
with in-depth expertise in different fields talk different languages, interpret same events differ-
ently, do not share the same values and interests and are immersed in specific practices 
(Carlile, 2002). These differences demarcate boundaries across areas of specialization and 
make the communication and integration of knowledge difficult. The communicative mode 
needs to allow for the development of a shared understanding and for the ‘generation’ of a 
new meaning among the interlocutors.  
In the following, we will focus on a specific type of communication, co-located face-
to-face conversations and discuss the role of collaborative visual tools that facilitate the inte-
gration of specialized knowledge in decision making. Conversations are especially suited to 
meet the above mentioned challenges as they allow for the co-construction of meaning and are 
a typical way in which members of an organization engage in sense-making (Weick, 1979). 
Conversations offer various analytical advantages for decision making. They are highly inter-
active and iterative; participants can ask clarifying questions, deepen certain aspects, and ask 
for the larger context of a specific piece of information. In conversations, the participants have 
the opportunity to adapt their language and the complexity of discourse to the characteristics 
of their vis-à-vis, and can continuously readjust their mode of communication when perceiving 
a specific verbal and non-verbal feedback of their communication partners (Krauss & Fussell, 
1991). All these are important aspects for overcoming knowledge boundaries. In addition, ar-
ticulating and summarizing information is another important process in sense-making (Dixon, 
1997) and the integration of knowledge. Conversations also create a shared experience (Dixon, 
1997); they build trust and strengthen the relationships between the participants (Harkins, 
1999). For all these characteristics of conversations, it is a preferred communication form for 
knowledge integration in groups for decision making processes. Von Krogh, Ijicho, and 
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Nonaka (2000) argue that “good conversations are the cradle of social knowledge in any or-
ganization” as they allow for the sharing of tacit knowledge within a micro community (von 
Krogh et al., 2000, p.125) and for the externalization of tacit knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995) through a collaborative development of a common language. 
In spite of the centrality of conversations for the process of knowledge integration, 
there are a variety of challenges that are present when integrating knowledge in conversations: 
A first set of challenges is related to routine conversational practices, which can be observed 
in a variety of conversational situations, but are particularly problematic for knowledge inte-
gration. Examples are defensive arguing (Argyris, 1996), unequal turn-talking (Ellinor & 
Gerard, 1998), or dichotomous arguing (Tannen, 1999). These patterns are based on cognitive 
and socio-psychological processes and tendencies like face-threatening or face-saving behav-
ior (Slugoski & Turnbull, 1988), poor analogical reasoning (Thompson, 2000), in-group favor-
itism (Brewer, 1979; Messick & Mackie, 1989), and groupthink (Janis & Mann, 1977). Such 
difficulties might be aggravated if there are strong differences in perspectives between the 
conversation partners (due to educational background, professional experiences, cultural orien-
tations, gender, social context, plans, goals, and other factors more) as is often the case in the 
expert-decision maker interaction.  
A second set of challenges for the integration of knowledge is bound to the communi-
cational form of conversations as such. Conversations are ephemeral and non-persistent 
(Bregman & Haythornthwaite, 2001) and the attempts to intelligently retain the content of 
conversations are still in their early stages. The decisive reasons and motivations behind the 
decisions taken are therefore often poorly documented. Conversations can take place in a co-
located form only if participants are physically present. If people are geographically dispersed, 
non-verbal signs that provide important further cues for sense-making, can still be communi-
cated (over streaming and video devices), but the deep and trustful relationships needed for 
knowledge integration are more difficult to develop (Chidambaram, 1996). Finally, conversa-
tions are essentially temporal, both in terms of the progression of the single speech acts as also 
in their wider context within a community or organization (Flores et al., 1988). This is a limi-
tation when people need to combine, compare, and evaluate large amounts of information 
items, all activities central to decision making in complex environments.  
In view of the centrality, but also limitations of conversations for the integration of 
knowledge in decision making, the question whether collaborative visualization software can 
support conversers in their knowledge integration attempts, is an important one. Based on the 
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literature, we will argue that visuals – used in complementary to the verbal language - offer 
various advantages in overcoming knowledge boundaries as they provide a shared resource 
and external referent for creating common ground (Carlile, 2002). The visual language en-
courages analogies and makes abstract thought more tangible (Inns, 2002; Kraut et al., 2003). 
These are all aspects which are important to create shared understanding. The semantics and 
syntax of visuals are looser defined than those of verbal language, which makes it easier to 
grasp something that is difficult to put into words (e.g. expressing tacit knowledge). As the 
visual is used in combination with talk, the discussion about its meaning can surface potential 
misunderstanding or ambiguities. This clarification process leads to a gradual development of 
common ground. We will also argue that images have an integrative capacity, as the various 
elements of which they are composed are visually related to one another. In this way, visuals 
help to maintain the big picture of a complex issue (Dimond & Beaumont, 1974; Kosslyn, 
1978; Maruyama, 1986).  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. By referring to the relevant litera-
ture on knowledge integration and through three explorative case studies, we will present a 
reflective model for knowledge integration. We then discuss the moderating effect of the use 
of collaborative visual tools for knowledge integration. In other words, we claim that although 
the proposed model is valid for knowledge-integrating conversations in general, the weight of 
its single components – equal participation, big picture, common ground, constructive conflict 
- varies depending on the modality of the conversation. Following this argument, we examine 
more specifically if some challenges of knowledge integration become more (less) important 
when supporting face-to-face conversations through interactive visualization. We formulate 
the hypotheses that, in the natural condition, because of a lack of common ground and the dif-
ficulty to create a big picture, conversation partners compensate with conflict, which threatens 
knowledge integration. We then present a comparative study using of a class-room experi-
ment, which serves as a first empirical test of the proposed model of knowledge integration 
and of the moderation effect of the group decision support tool.  
A Communicative Model for Knowledge Integration in Decision 
Making 
Differentiation and the consequent need for integration and coordination is a classical 
theme in organizational studies (Galbraith, 1995; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). With the more 
recent discussion on expertise and knowledge as key resources of organizations (Grant, 
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1996b), the discourse on specialization and integration has started to be led more specifically 
with regard to knowledge. Grant describes this idea as follows:  
“If knowledge is a critical input into all production processes, if efficiency requires that it is created and 
stored by individuals in specialized form, and if production requires the application of many types of special-
ized knowledge, then the primary role of the firm is the integration of knowledge” (Grant, 1996a: 377).  
Organizations that aim to create complex products or services, solve multifaceted prob-
lems, and make decisions in uncertain environments, they need to manage and facilitate the 
collaboration of people with different expertise and specializations. In view of the centrality of 
knowledge integration for the organizational activity, a still rather small but growing commu-
nity of scholars started to focus on this particular knowledge process (Alavi & Tiwana, 2002; 
Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2004; Carlile & Rebentisch, 2003; Dougherty, 1992; Eisenhardt & San-
tos, 2000; Grant, 1996a). While the discourse on knowledge integration is based on the prem-
ise that there is a simultaneous need for a specialization of knowledge and for coordination 
among specialized knowledge areas, various understandings and approaches can be identified. 
Knowledge integration can be understood on an individual (Davis, 2003; Linn et al., 2003; 
Linn et al., 2004; Linn & Hsi, 2000) or on a social level (Alavi & Tiwana, 2002; Grant, 1996a; 
Huang & Newell, 2003; Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 2002).  
Many authors implicitly or explicitly relate the concept of knowledge integration to the 
one of transfer. While some use the two words interchangeably, other authors insist on impor-
tant distinctions between the two knowledge processes. Some claim that both transfer and in-
tegration models are valuable depending on the requirements determined by the situation of 
the organization and of its environment. Carlile and Rebentisch, for example, say that, first, 
depending on the amount of novelty arisen in the environment between the moments when 
knowledge is stored and retrieved (fast changing versus stable environments) and, second, 
conditional upon how strongly the various sources of specialized knowledge depend on each 
other, either transfer or integration models are most adequate. When novelty and dependence 
are high, transfer models are insufficient and integration models, which envision transforma-
tion processes, are necessary (Carlile & Rebentisch, 2003). Others criticize knowledge transfer 
models even more generally and claim that these are mostly founded on a mechanical under-
standing of knowledge processes and on a conception of knowledge as an object rather than as 
an activity and practice (Cook & Brown, 1999). They argue that in the wide-spread object-
view of knowledge (Argote & Ingram, 2000; Walsh & Ungson, 1991) should be replaced by a 
conceptualization of knowledge as a part of action, an activity of knowing. Knowledge is situ-
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ated (Bechky, 2003) and bound to practice (Brown & Duguid, 2001), knowledge cannot be 
transferred, distributed, or disseminated, but has to be “generated in” other contexts, groups, or 
organizations (Cook & Brown, 1999, p.398). Knowledge always has to be actively constructed 
in a new context, it has to be transformed (Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2004). Unlike knowledge 
transfer, the term ‘knowledge integration’ better accounts for the transformations involved in 
the interactions between people using “knowledge as a tool” (Cook & Brown, 1999, p.388).  
Studies on knowledge integration differ with regard to how knowledge integration is 
conceptualized and at which unit it is analyzed. Knowledge integration can be understood on 
an individual (Davis, 2003; Linn et al., 2003; Linn et al., 2004; Linn & Hsi, 2000) or on a so-
cial level (Alavi & Tiwana, 2002; Grant, 1996a; Huang & Newell, 2003; Okhuysen & Eisen-
hardt, 2002).  
Conceived as an individual practice, knowledge integration describes the process by 
which an individual integrates new information into his/her existing knowledge structure (Linn 
et al., 2004). The ‘old’ knowledge is not simply replaced by other ideas, neither is the new 
idea simply assimilated in the existing knowledge structure. Instead, knowledge integration 
takes place through a processes of interlinking, contextualizing, comparing, interpreting, and 
evaluating (Linn et al., 2003). All these processes are understood cognitively and researchers 
are interested in instructional designs that can enhance them (Davis, 2003, p. 23). 
Understood as a social process, researchers are interested in how specialized individual 
knowledge is integrated into some sort of collective knowledge (Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 
2002). While some researchers focus on the group level of analysis (Alavi & Tiwana, 2002; 
Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 2002; Piontkowski & Keil, 2004; Piontkowski et al., 2004), others 
analyze the process on an organizational level (Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2004; Carlile & Reben-
tisch, 2003; De Boer et al., 1999; Eisenhardt & Santos, 2000; Grant, 1996a; Huang & Newell, 
2003; Ravasi & Verona, 2001) and still others focus on knowledge integration across organi-
zations (within networks of organizations) (Swan & Scarbrough, 2005).  
On a group unit of analysis knowledge integration is defined as “the synthesis of indi-
vidual's specialized knowledge into situation-specific systemic knowledge” (Alavi & Tiwana, 
2002: 1030). Researchers in these context aim to understand how knowledge is integrated in 
and through communication and examine interaction patterns and media (e.g. online, face-to-
face, knowledge management systems) (Alavi & Tiwana, 2002; Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 
2002; Piontkowski & Keil, 2004).  
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On an organizational level, the seminal work on knowledge integration is the one of 
Grant (1996a). In his view, knowledge integration is the incorporation of the individuals’ spe-
cialized (mainly tacit but also explicit) knowledge into tasks and organizational action. The 
main integration mechanism is not communication, but are direction, organizational routines 
(Grant, 1996a), and self-contained tasks (Huang & Newell, 2003). Yet, both giving direction 
and installing routines requires a communication that is based on a sufficient common knowl-
edge and a shared language (Grant, 1996a: 380). There’s another group of researchers equally 
analyzing knowledge integration on an organizational level, but which places stronger empha-
sis on coordination and communication. By analyzing knowledge integration efforts across 
functional divisions (Carlile, 2002; Dougherty, 1992), between occupational groups (Bechky, 
2003) or between projects and the organization as a whole (Scarbrough et al., 2004), they dis-
cuss how ‘knowledge boundaries’ (Star, 1989) develop across specialized areas of expertise 
and what challenges subsist by attempting to integrate knowledge across these boundaries. In 
view of the embedded nature of knowledge, knowledge integration requires a transformation 
process of meaning and of interests (Carlile, 2004), which is why it is fundamental to engage 
in boundary spanning activities. Such activities include the use of boundary objects (docu-
ments, forms, methods, objects, etc.) used by individuals and groups at both sides of a knowl-
edge boundary, which help them “to specify and learn about their differences and dependen-
cies” (Carlile, 2002: 452)) as well as the positioning of knowledge brokers (people who move 
between two knowledge domains and like to engage in processes of translation, coordination, 
and alignment between perspectives (Wenger, 1998)). 
Finally, there are few contributions dealing with knowledge-integration on an inter-
organizational level. For an organization to be innovative, the integration of external knowl-
edge is fundamental (Swan & Scarbrough, 2005). Depending on the type of knowledge to be 
integrated, but also on the speed, with which such knowledge has to be integrated, the cou-
plings between organizations must be of a different nature (Grant, 1996a). Grant argues that 
while market contracts might work if the knowledge is embedded in the product itself, net-
works with close relationships are useful if knowledge is ambiguous, uncertain, and tacit. Fur-
ther, if companies gain important advantages from the speed of integration (dynamic environ-
ments), knowledge integration is preferred to happen in networks rather than through vertical 
integration. Swan and Scarbrough finally claim that if knowledge is particularly diverse 
among the various organizations (difference between knowledge sources), close ties and in-
formal interactions are particularly important to establish the sufficient common ground (Swan 
& Scarbrough, 2005). 
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On a group unit of analysis knowledge integration is defined as “the synthesis of indi-
vidual's specialized knowledge into situation-specific systemic knowledge” (Alavi & Tiwana, 
2002: 1030). Scholars aim to understand how knowledge is integrated in and through commu-
nication and examine interaction patterns and media (e.g. online, face-to-face, knowledge 
management systems) (Alavi & Tiwana, 2002; Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 2002; Piontkowski & 
Keil, 2004).  
Finally, on an organizational level, the seminal work on knowledge integration is the 
one of Grant (1996a). In his view, knowledge integration is the incorporation of the individu-
als’ specialized (mainly tacit but also explicit) knowledge into tasks and organizational action. 
The main integration mechanism is not communication, but are direction, organizational rou-
tines (Grant, 1996a), and self-contained tasks (Huang & Newell, 2003). Yet, both giving direc-
tion and installing routines requires a communication that is based on a sufficient common 
knowledge and a shared language (Grant, 1996a: 380).  
In line with our previous argumentation and given our context of study, we conceptual-
ize knowledge integration as a social process that takes place in interaction and not as an indi-
vidual process (in which an individual integrates a new piece of information into his/her exist-
ing knowledge structures). Understood as a social process, some authors focus more on the 
integration of specialized individual knowledge into (group) knowledge structures (Alavi & 
Tiwana, 2002), or, alternatively, on the integration of knowledge into action (Grant, 1996a) 
and decision making processes (for a more elaborate distinction of these various approaches 
and understandings of knowledge integration, (see:Mengis & Eppler, 2005a)). In our view, it 
is fruitful to combine both perspectives and understand knowledge integration as an interre-
lated two-phase-process: A first phase of integration is the co-creation of the specialized 
knowledge of individuals into group knowledge structures. In a second phase, knowledge in-
tegration involves the application of the integrated knowledge within a group of experts and 
decision makers into the actual decision making process. The following model (see: Fehler! 
Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.) reflects these two levels of the knowledge 
integration process.  
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We argue that if domain experts and decision makers manage to overcome four central 
communicative challenges, which are balanced participation, big picture, common ground, and 
constructive conflict, they are more likely successful in integrating their specialized, individual 
knowledge into synthetic common group knowledge structures (1st integration phase). Second, 
we stipulate that if specialized individual knowledge is successfully integrated in group 
knowledge (1st phase integration), a stronger decision commitment is the result. Decision 
commitment is an indicator for the integration of knowledge in action and decision making 
(2nd phase integration).  
In this form, the model we present is an indirect reflective model with multiple mediat-
ing constructs (Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000). As a reflective model, the measures “represent 
reflections, or manifestations”, of the construct and are not viewed as the causes of the con-
struct (Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000: 155). We therefore would not say that knowledge integra-
tion is caused by equal participation, the establishment of a common ground and a big picture, 
and finally by the presence of a constructive construct. Rather, the conjoint manifestations of 
the said variables are reflections of the occurrence of knowledge integration. It is an indirect 
model insofar as the variables reflecting ‘knowledge integration’ are mediating variables that 
cannot be observed directly and ‘knowledge integration’ can be understood as a second order 
factor.  
Figure 1: A Reflective Model for Knowledge Integration in Decision Making 
Knowledge
Integration 
in Decision 
Making
Constructive
Conflict
Common 
Ground
Big Picture
Balanced
Participation
Decision 
Commitment
1st phase integration 2nd phase integration
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5
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In the following, we will present the single order constructs of knowledge integration 
one by one. We do so by referring, on the one hand, to the insights we have gained from ex-
plorative case study work, and, on the other, to the existing communication and knowledge 
management literature.  
Regarding the case study work, we have drawn on evidence from three case studies. 
Common criteria for the selection of the cases are that the duplet “domain experts – decision 
makers” must be easily identifiable, that the decision issue is complex and ambiguous, and 
that there is a strong motivation to integrate the specialized knowledge in the decision making 
process. The cases differ substantially in terms of type of knowledge to be integrated or 
whether the knowledge integration process takes place in an intra- or an inter-organizational 
context. We were explicitly looking for variances in the institutional context and the type of 
knowledge, so we could be more certain when we would attribute recurring communicative 
patterns that would emerge across the cases to the situation of knowledge asymmetry between 
experts and decision makers.  
In the first case, we have looked at the integration of knowledge and the communica-
tion processes between the experts of a major U.S. think tank and the policy makers in the 
U.S. Senate. In the second case, we have analyzed the knowledge communication between IT 
specialists and the middle managers of a large financial institution. The third case examines 
the knowledge communication between domain specific consultants and their clients. For all 
cases, we have considered a multitude of sources. For each case we have conducted around 
eleven half-structured interviews, each of which lasted on average 45 minutes. We have inter-
viewed mainly domain experts, but to a less extent also decision makers. We have transcribed 
the interviews and have engaged in a comparative coding activity to solicit patterns and cate-
gories from the interview data (Glaser, 1998). In addition and contingent on the particular 
situation of each case, we have conducted a qualitative analysis of communication outlets such 
as the web site, articles, reports, power point presentations, and meetings minutes (for a sys-
tematic and detailed documentation of the cases, see: www.knowledge-communication.org). 
From the cross-case analysis of the three cases, we were able to identify recurring communica-
tive challenges and practices. From this analysis and by drawing on the literature on knowl-
edge integration in decision making, we have developed the following model for knowledge 
integration. In the present article, we will use the evidence from the cases only in an explor-
ative way to further motivate – next to the argumentation of the present literature – the choice 
of the elements of the here presented model for knowledge integration.  
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Equal Participation 
Groups often fail to maximize the contribution of all members (Stasser & Stewart, 
1992). Certain participants in a conversation, often subordinates, feel inhibited to expose their 
own ideas to management for fear of criticism (Dixon, 1997). In other instances, management 
has a rather autocratic style and does not actively seek for the contribution of others 
(Eisenhardt et al., 2000). Unbalanced power structures lead to instances in which conversation 
partners participate in an unequal manner in the conversation process so that the various per-
spectives on an issue are not brought up and considered equally (Ellinor et al., 1998). A bal-
anced participation of all conversation partners is an important pre-condition for knowledge 
integration.. In a situation in which not all participants of a conversation can participate in the 
collaborative co-construction of knowledge, the specialized knowledge of all members will 
not be integrated. Without the equal participation of all conversation partners, collaborative 
learning (Dixon, 1997) and knowledge integration are therefore impossible. In the interviews 
for the three explorative case studies, it has turned out clearly that both experts and decision 
makers are quite aware that an important part of their job is to actively incite the participation 
of the other party. They reported that only in this way they obtained the necessary information, 
they could get a feeling of the other’s perspective, they could discover the hidden causes of a 
problem, and could prevent possible misunderstandings. Several referred to the necessity to be 
skilled in various techniques that permitted to elicit the necessary information. Also the litera-
ture stresses this aspect of balanced participation and various authors descriptively define ef-
fective knowledge-intensive conversation as interactions in which participants alternate their 
contributions in balanced ways and actively engage in participation and collaboration (Barge 
& Oliver, 2003; Beer & Eisenstat, 2004; Dixon, 1997; Eisenhardt et al., 2000; Ellinor & 
Gerard, 1998; von Krogh et al., 2000). We claim that:   
H1: the equal participation of all participants in a conversation positively reflects the 
process of knowledge integration.  
Big Picture 
Gaining and sustaining the big picture is a particularly difficult challenge of the expert-
decision maker interaction and an important indicator of knowledge integration. During the 
case interviews, experts and decision makers mentioned frequently that a major difficulty of 
their interactions is not to loose track of the overarching thread of an issue, but to integrate 
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their various points of view and the range of pertinent aspects in order to finally understand 
how these different elements interrelate with each other and form an integrative whole. They 
often had the feeling of being stuck in a sea of technical details of which they did not know 
how they related to the more general issue that was the object of decision. Experts and deci-
sion makers have to struggle quite a bit to bring their various highly specialized perspectives 
together and to build a more profound and shared understanding of the issue that is object of 
decision. Taken the arguments together that emerged in the interviews, it seems that the big-
picture challenge is related to the capacity to see and draw interconnections and to find an 
adequate level of detail/abstraction. We define the big picture challenge as the difficulty to 
gain and keep an adequate overview of a complex issue by identifying its main drivers and the 
interconnections among them, while paying sufficient attention to its relevant details. 
Experts and decision makers have to see the interconnections between the various per-
spectives they bring into the discussion, between the punctuated issue on which they have to 
decide and the larger context in which it is embedded (e.g. related issues). Experts and deci-
sion makers have a very specific view on the issue and often are not able to envision the big 
picture of a solution or decision on their own, but have to integrate both perspectives. In this 
situation, the challenge is to be open enough for another perspective and to see the intercon-
nections among the different perspectives and points of view. Second, experts and decision 
makers have to understand how a specific technical aspect that an expert mentions relates to 
the more general discourse of the issue. Harkins defines “big-picture thinking” as the “ability 
to conceptualize underlying or systemic causes driving a problem or issue” (Harkins, 1999: 
34). In this light, the capability to gain and maintain the big picture is strongly related to the 
ability of systemic thinking. Senge advocates that while traditional analysis focuses on sepa-
rating out different pieces, the holistic perspective of the systems thinking approach focuses on 
how things are interrelated and how they form an overall system (Senge, 1990). The challenge 
is to connect isolated pieces into recursive causal chains and to develop a more dynamic view 
of a system.1  
                                                 
1 In the realm of systemic thinking, the big picture challenge has been discussed mainly as an individual 
challenge and not as a social and communicative one as proposed here. Other authors who conceived this prob-
lem on an individual level, have further argued that certain cognitive styles (e.g. the ‘imaginist’) are better suited 
to see the big picture than others (Graetz, 2002). While for them, the capacity to see the big picture is innate and 
stable for a person, Gasper and Clore have shown, in contrast, that the individuals’ mood impacts on his/her 
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Next and related to the issue of interconnections, the big picture problem is also about 
the adequate level of detail or abstraction. Too much detail leads to disorientation (how does 
the detail relate to the more general issue?) and a feeling of a loss of time and of a lack of per-
tinence. It has been argued that “creative processes involve first envisioning ‘the big picture’ 
and then working out the details at a later stage. A sculptor, for example, starts by carving out 
a rough outline and then progressively adds finer detail” (Ringach, 2003: 7). Yet, in many 
cases, experts and decision makers cannot simply adopt such “a top-down (or coarse-to-fine) 
method“ (Ringach, 2003: 7), but “the big picture is formed by small details” so that the chal-
lenge is not simply to understand the big threads of an issue, but also the small details of 
which they are made (Sull et al., 2005: 37). Providing details is often necessary to understand 
a more abstract concept, to see the implications of an issue, and to comprehend whether or not 
a certain solution is feasible. Rhodes argues on this purpose that “one of the most common 
reasons for being off the mark is operating on the wrong level or scale” (Rhodes, 1991: 162-
163) and not marking clearly on which level of detail one is operating. It is not self-evident to 
judge upon the importance and pertinence of a piece of information and to determine the ade-
quate level of detail. Experts, with their very domain specific, but profound knowledge 
(Hoffman et al., 1995), perceive something as still quite abrasive and superficial while for the 
decision makers it is already extremely specific and too rich in detail.  
With regard to the interconnectivity-capacity and the level of detail/abstraction, we can 
understand the big picture challenge as related to the issue upon which decision makers have 
to decide and for which they ask for the experts’ advise. Alternatively, we can understand the 
problem as related to the process of the conversation itself. The interconnection issue, for ex-
ample, refers to the challenge to see the links among the causes of an issue, or between the 
causes and their symptoms. But the interconnection issue can refer, also, to the challenge to 
draw the connection between what X said five minutes ago and what Y said just a moment ago 
and whether there are explicit links among the single contributions or phases in a conversation, 
which facilitates the creation of the bigger picture. We believe that the big picture of the issue 
and the big picture of the conversation process are very much interlinked so that a more ex-
plicit structure of the conversation process also facilitates to gain the big picture on the issue. 
In a conversation, in which it is clear how a certain statement relates to another and on which 
level of abstraction one is moving, it is also easier to understand how a certain technical detail 
                                                                                                                                                        
capacity to see the big picture; if people are happy, they tend to be more oriented on the forest, if they are sad 
they merely look at the trees (Gasper & Clore, 2002). 
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of the problem refers to one of its more general drivers. In order to keep the ‘big picture’ con-
struct as clean as possible and not to mix it up with the other constructs of our model, we focus 
entirely on the process level of the conversation process itself. We claim that:  
H2: successfully coping with the big picture challenge positively reflects the process of 
knowledge integration.  
Common Ground 
Alavi and Tiwana argued that ‘mutual understanding’ or mutual knowledge – under-
stood as the knowledge that is shared among people and that is known to be shared - repre-
sents one of the key challenges of knowledge integration. They say that “it lies at the intersec-
tion of the specialized knowledge sets that a virtual organization must integrate” (Alavi & Ti-
wana, 2002: 1033). Similarly, Carlile (2004)and also Bechky (2003) refer to the importance of 
‘common knowledge’ or ‘common ground’ for managing knowledge integration across 
boundaries. In communication theory, this is best known as the ‘common ground’ challenge, 
as proposed by Clark and his colleagues (Clark, 1996; Clark & Brennan, 1991; Clark & Mar-
shall, 1981). Common ground is defined by the context conversation partners can reasonably 
assume to be sharing among them. It includes their background knowledge, beliefs, current 
interpretations, goals, values, but also their social and physical context and more personal at-
tributes as speech style or emotional state (Krauss & Fussell, 1991). It is said that communica-
tion is more efficient and productive when people share greater amounts of common ground 
(Olson & Olson, 2000). At least, participants of a conversation need to share a minimal com-
mon ground in order to understand each other and to take informed decisions. Fahey and Pru-
sak outline for example: “In the absence of shared context, individuals’ differing perspectives, 
beliefs, assumptions, and views of the future are most likely to collide and thus immobilize 
decision making” (1998: 258). They believe that without the needed shared context, people 
will not reach a deeper understanding through dialogue and will not be able to traverse the 
difficult path from information to knowledge and neither from knowledge to decision making. 
A related concept to the one of common ground is “ba”, which has been introduced by Nonaka 
and his colleagues. They understand “ba” as a shared physical, virtual, and mental space, “a 
‘phenomenal’ place” (Nonaka & Konno, 1998: 41), which is necessary in order to create new 
knowledge. Although the concept of “ba” is larger than the one of common ground, it stresses 
the same idea that, in order to engage in processes such as knowledge creation or knowledge 
integration, it is necessary to share a certain common space, in which the knowledge to be 
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integrated can be embedded. It is a space that involves shared experiences, ideas, values, but 
also common physical and virtual rooms, which include artifacts and universes of meaning.  
Interaction partners engage in grounding (activities to build common ground) by using 
the sources of community membership, linguistic co-presence, and physical co-presence 
(Clark & Marshall, 1981). If people know that they belong to a same group or population, they 
can assume that the peculiarities of this group can be considered to be common ground (com-
munity membership). Second, if they had prior interactions (linguistic co-presence), they then 
have established certain aspects and relations to be common ground (they have agreed in ear-
lier communications that when X is true then Y). Finally, if they share the same physical set-
ting (physical co-presence), they can use it in the form of deictic speech (by pointing and using 
words like ‘that’ or ‘here’) and non-verbal communication (e.g. gestures) to build common 
ground (Clark & Marshall, 1981).  
In the expert-decision maker situation, these sources of common ground are often 
sparse; communication partners do not belong to the same professional community and have a 
few knowledge on the peculiarities of the other community, they have few interactions with 
each other (lack of linguistic co-presence), and communicate in written formats (lack of physi-
cal co-presence). In fact, many interviewees of the here reported case studies referred to the 
common ground challenge: Experts, when preparing their reports or presentations, often have 
difficulties in assessing the decision makers’ knowledge and even in evaluating their own 
knowledge in relation to the others: What should they expose that is valuable to the decision 
makers? What can they take for granted? The common ground challenge also comes to play 
when experts and decision makers have to deal with implicit misunderstandings. They are of-
ten unaware of using specific terms (e.g. process management) in a completely different way 
(e.g. as a management versus a support process) and realize that they have misunderstood each 
other only much later. This can lead to considerable consequences such as late redefinition of 
project scopes and consequent project delays. The fact that experts and decision makers use 
language differently implies not only that they have different understandings of terms, but 
includes also different ways of expression, the use of different jargon, and other conventional 
features (differences in phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics (Clark, 
1996)). It turned out several times in the interviews that underlain to language, experts and 
decision makers have quite different perspectives and modes of thinking, which makes a 
shared understanding quite challenging. While economic experts, for example, are inclined 
thinking that when ‘all else being equal, the partial equation of changing this is changing that’, 
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policy makers often infer from the concomitance of two events that they must be casually in-
terrelated. Interviewees reported throughout the various case situations that if the lack of 
common ground is very apparent (for example if the expert’s knowledge is very specific and 
technical or if experts and decision makers interact for the first times), it is particularly impor-
tant to interact frequently, meeting physically and informally, and rely on face-to-face conver-
sations. 
The concept of “common ground” comprises not only the idea that the communication 
partners share a common understanding of an issue and a joint vision of what they are aiming 
to achieve. As the first examples from the case studies have shown, it also means that the ex-
perts and decision makers have a sense of the reciprocal knowledge and perspectives. This 
latter aspect of the common ground – to have a sense of what knowledge is shared among ex-
perts and decision makers and what is unique to each party - is similar to the concept of trans-
active memory to which we have referred earlier on. Only with a sufficient common ground, 
the communicator is able to adjust his/her messages to the receiver, what does he know and 
what doesn’t he, and what level of complexity will be suited to assure his/her understanding? 
Krauss and Fussell call this activity ‘reciprocal perspective-taking’, in which one tries to ex-
perience the situation as it is lived by others and adapt the content and form of the message to 
it (1998). The reciprocal perspective-taking is an important aspect in forming common ground 
among communicators. If it lacks, people ultimately have to draw on their knowledge of the 
more general social categories to which their vis-à-vis belongs (e.g. car fan, engineer, New 
Yorker) and from which they can induce certain general characteristics (Clark, 1996; Krauss 
& Fussell, 1998). As the conversation partners go on in the interaction, they receive continu-
ous verbal, para-verbal, and non verbal feedback and this additional information allows them 
for gradually fine-tuning their assumptions of the perspectives and information needs of the 
others (Krauss & Fussell, 1998; Schober & Clark, 1989). In this way, the more the experts and 
decision makers interact, the more they establish a common ground between them, and the 
better they can adjust their mode of interaction. Conversations are a communicational form 
that allows participants for sharing experiences and therewith is especially important in creat-
ing ‘personal common ground’ (Clark, 1996). Common experiences are “powerful sources of 
shared meaning because it is possible to reference the experience and thus to bring to mind for 
everyone a meaningful image” (Dixon, 1997: 32). 
The critical reader might legitimately ask if there is not an apparent contradiction be-
tween the here proclaimed necessity of a common ground, on the one hand, and, on the other 
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hand, the growing necessity for strong specialization of functions and roles (it is the very 
scope of experts and decision makers to have different perspectives, backgrounds, priorities)? 
Deetz, for example, describes the sustaining of differences (and the therewith going creativity) 
as an altogether opposite objective of dialogue than aiming for common ground and value 
consensus (Heath et al., 2006). Similarly, Dyer and Nobeoka could show in a different context 
(they analyzed the sharing of knowledge on a company network level) that “strong ties” (i.e. a 
lot of common ground) are well suited for the diffusion (exploitation) of existing knowledge 
rather than for the exploration of new knowledge, which is the strength of “weak ties”-
relations (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000: 364/365). Translated to the context of experts and decision 
makers, this means that strong ties and a lot of common ground would lead mainly to status 
quo-oriented decisions, which are rather problematic in complex, ambiguous, high-velocity 
environments. We see this apparent stretch between common ground and specialization not as 
dualisms, but as dualities. The common ground challenge really is a question of balance. Too 
much common ground would turn the separation of the expert and decision maker roles obso-
lete, too less common ground would turn their communication extremely difficult if not im-
possible. The aim in the collaboration of experts and decision makers therefore must be to 
assure a necessary common ground, but not to have too large overlaps. For groups who have 
just been formed, as is the case of the experimental setting of this study, the risk to have too 
much common ground and not enough specialization is relatively small. We claim that: 
H3: establishing a common ground among the conversation partners positively reflects 
the process of knowledge integration. 
Constructive Conflict 
Conflict of some form has been a recurring issue in the interviews for the explorative 
case studies. Conflict often is relational and the interviewers referred to it, for example, as the 
decision makers’ general suspicion towards the expertise of the domain experts. Conflict also 
takes the form of reciprocal negative prejudices (e.g. experts believe that the decision makers 
will never be able to understand the engineering aspects the decision involves), of lacking 
trust, and of the fear for loosing face and therefore pretending to know or refusing to get to 
know more. Decision makers are quite naturally inclined to thinking that they hold their lead-
ing role because they have the necessary experience and knowledge. It is therefore not an easy 
task form them to admit their ignorance in front of a domain expert and to embrace the knowl-
edge that is offered to him/her. Yet, conflict arises not only because of relational issues. It is 
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also bound to disagreements and differences in perspective with regard to the task and content 
of the decision. Experts and decision makers tend to weight issues differently and have differ-
ent time horizons. The proposition of accurate, thorough solutions might stand in conflict to 
the decision maker’s need for pragmatic, quick fixes. The focus on more systemic, integrated 
views might be counterintuitive for someone who is used to think at one thing at a time. The 
interviewers reported that such differences in orientation often required long discussions in 
order to achieve a shared understanding.   
The subdivision of conflict into relationship and task conflict was proposed by Jehn 
(1995), who basically made two claims when proposing this distinction. On the one hand, re-
lationship conflict – understood as an emotional conflict and a perception of an interpersonal 
incompatibility - is detrimental for team effectiveness, decision quality, and decision commit-
ment. People feel stressed and anxious and they perceive the conflict as a threat to their iden-
tity and their feelings of self worth (Jehn & Mannix, 2001). In such a situation, people are 
hesitant to expose their ideas, to inquire collaboratively into new solutions, and to integrate 
their knowledge. Jehn and Mannix (2001) argue that their ability to process information is 
reduced since they spend most of their energy focusing on each other. For these reasons, rela-
tionship conflict negatively reflects knowledge integration. 
On the other hand, task conflict – a perception of disagreements (in terms of view-
points, ideas, opinions) regarding the content of a decision - can have important positive ef-
fects (Jehn, 1995). Advantages of task conflict are that people scrutinize task issues and en-
gage in a deep and deliberate processing of the available information. It encourages a greater 
cognitive understanding of the issue (and therefore leads to a better decision quality). Finally, 
it fosters learning, the development of innovative insights, and a stronger decision commit-
ment (Simons & Peterson, 2000). These are all important aspects for the process of knowledge 
integration. Similarly, Eisenhardt and her colleagues argue that task conflict is important for 
developing a more complete understanding of the choices and for creating a richer range of 
options (Eisenhardt et al., 2000: 77). Finally, task conflict is said to foster innovation because 
it makes people consider the perspectives of others and create new understandings of appar-
ently known issues (De Dreu, 1997). Yet, a very strong task conflict is said to have negative 
effects on member satisfaction, or on the commitment to the team and decision (Amason, 
1996; Simons & Peterson, 2000). People feel frustrated when some people continuously take 
their chance to disagree and oppose and therewith delay the decision (Peterson, 1999). Simi-
larly, we argue that in presence of a too high level of task conflict, conversation partners have 
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difficulties in integrating knowledge. If the perspectives, points of view, and opinions are very 
far away from each other, tough content based argumentations are not reflecting a real integra-
tion of knowledge. People will continue to believe their point of view. They might acknowl-
edge the opposite opinion to have a reason of existence, but remain far from seriously consid-
ering it for the further development of their own point of view. We will therefore stipulate that 
the relationship of task conflict and knowledge integration is one of an inverted U-curve: in 
the presence of a low or very high level of task conflict, knowledge is not integrated (see: 
Figure 2). A moderate level of task conflict best reflects knowledge integration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Task conflict (that increases group’s effectiveness) and relationship conflict (that re-
duces it) are not independent, but strongly correlated with each other. Rather, more task con-
flict leads to more relationship conflict (De Dreu & Van Vianen, 2001; De Dreu & Weingart, 
2003; Simons & Peterson, 2000). Simons and Peterson (2000) report eleven studies who could 
show that content conflict is highly correlated with relationship conflict (range r = -.17 to .88, 
mean r = .47). As argue Eisenhardt and her colleagues (2000) and much earlier already Argy-
ris and Schon (1978), a plausible explanation for this is that people often understand a critique, 
that is intended on a content level, as a personal attack. Simon and Peterson call this a misat-
tribution of task conflict, in which the participants of a conversation engage in biased informa-
tion processing and self-fulfilling prophecies. They induce intentions and hidden agendas and 
see them confirmed in their interpretations of the others’ ambiguous behaviour (Simons & 
Peterson, 2000). Such a misattribution more easily takes place if conversation partners express 
their content conflict poorly and use harsh and homonym language. On the other hand, a mis-
attribution of relationship conflict as task conflict is equally possible. People masquerade their 
inter-relational problems as task issues and continue to sabotage a person by bringing up hesi-
Task Conflict
Knowledge
Integration
low moderate high
Figure 2:  An Inverted-U-Relationship of Task Conflict and 
Knowledge Integration (Proposition) 
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tations and critique on a content level (Simons & Peterson, 2000). It is for all these reasons 
that substantive issues can no longer be separated from those based on personalities.  
This correlation between task and relationship conflict poses a dilemma in dealing with 
conflict. If we aim to have a moderate level of task conflict to create a deeper understanding 
and a better integration of knowledge, we risk, at the same time, that the task conflict is 
(mis)understood on a relational level (as a relationship conflict) and that the overall outcome 
in terms of team performance, decision commitment, or decision satisfaction is negative.  
Thus, three conflict conditions have to be present in order to allow for knowledge inte-
gration: 1. a moderate level of task conflict; 2. a low level of relationship conflict; 3. a low 
correlation between task conflict and relationship conflict. We define the concomitant occur-
rence of these three conditions as a situation of constructive conflict. We stipulate that:  
H4: constructive conflict positively reflects the process of knowledge integration. 
Decision Commitment 
In order to conceptualize the second phase of knowledge integration, that is the inte-
gration of the systemic group knowledge into decision making and action, we include the vari-
able decision commitment. The more the participants of a conversation are successful in inte-
grating their individual specialized knowledge into systemic group knowledge (i.e. occurrence 
of first level knowledge integration), the more they will feel committed to the decisions taken. 
Decision commitment leads, as is discussed in the literature (see for example: Dooley et al., 
2000; Janis & Mann, 1977; Priem et al., 1995; West & Schwenk, 1996), to a more successful 
implementation of decision and as Habermas claimed knowledge can be considered to be mu-
tual and shared not simply if the participants agree in their opinions, but if they reach an inter-
subjective acknowledgement of demands of validity, that is if they accept something as bind-
ing for their future behaviour (Habermas, 1984: 573-374). In this understanding, the require-
ment is rather high for what is considered to the result of knowledge integration. Yet, this view 
draws the link between knowledge and the commitment to action. In other words, it implies 
that if knowledge really is integrated we can expect a stronger commitment to the decision 
taken. On the other hand, if the decision is not based on a real integration of knowledge, but 
rather on a unilateral exertion of influence, then also the commitment for the decision taken 
should be smaller. We therefore include ‘decision commitment’ as a dependent variable of our 
model, while clearly maintaining the central interest for the construct of ‘knowledge integra-
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tion’. Prior research could show that a stronger decision commitment leads to a more success-
ful implementation of the decision in action (Dooley et al., 2000). We claim that:  
H5: decision commitment positively reflects the second phase of the knowledge inte-
gration process (integration of group knowledge into decision making) for that the better the 
knowledge integration of individual knowledge into group knowledge in the first phase, the 
higher the integration in the second phase (i.e. the higher the decision commitment). 
Having outlined a communicative model for knowledge integration in decision mak-
ing, we will discuss, in the next section, how the use of a software-based, interactive visualiza-
tion tool impacts on the process how people integrate their specialized knowledge in systemic 
group knowledge and decision making.  
The Role of an Collaborative Visualization Tool within the Process 
of Knowledge Integration 
Approaches to the Study of Technology Use in Organizations  
The role of technology for the processes of organizing and social interaction has been 
studied through a variety of theoretical lenses and approaches. Theses range from determinis-
tic views on technology (for an overview, see: Bimber, 1998), in which technology affects 
people and social systems in quite dramatic ways, to theories of social construction (Pinch & 
Bijker, 1992), in which technology is viewed, on the one hand, as an artefact and an outcome 
of social interactions and that, on the other hand, is only mediating, and not determining, so-
cial processes and structures. Along this second stream, structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) is 
among the most widely used theories to study the interactions between information systems 
(IS) and organizational structures and processes. Jones and Karsten (2003) stated that more 
than 250 papers in IS made reference to Gidden’s work. The most prominent further develop-
ments (in terms of an applicability of Gidden’s structuration theory in the IS context) are both 
the adaptive structuration theory (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994) and the structurational model of 
technology (Orlikowski, 1992; Orlikowski & Robey, 1991).  
The structuration theory is an attempt to see social structure (which mostly is the focus 
of positivist and functionalist sociologic theories, but also of structuralism) and individual 
agency (which has been stressed by interpretivist theories such as phenomenology or eth-
nomethodology) as a mutually interacting duality (Giddens, 1984: 1). Giddens defines social 
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structure as “rules and resources recursively implicated in social reproduction” (Giddens, 
1984: xxxi) that is a set of rules and resources that are manifest in ongoing social practice. As 
such, social structure implicates a normative element in the sense that it constrains and enables 
certain types of behaviour. At the same time, it entails also codes of signification for how we 
create meaning of the environment around us. Social structure exists only in recurring action 
and at the same time mediates the latter (duality of structure) (Giddens, 1984: 19). As a conse-
quence, in Gidden’s view, objects, such as technological artefacts, do not carry social structure 
(Orlikowski, 2000). Yet, in one of its most widely used applied versions, in adaptive structura-
tion theory (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994), technology is said to reflect existing social structures, 
which are present among the interactions of its designers. Developers of a technology share 
dominant interpretations and interests and ‘inscribe’ (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994; Latour, 1992; 
Orlikowski, 1992) certain interpretative schemes and (social) norms into their artefacts. This 
idea differs from the one proposed by Giddens. In his view, recurring social practice is the 
central motor of structuring, and even if technology is characterized by a set of properties, the 
way how these properties will be actually used is not predetermined by the technological arte-
fact alone (Giddens, 1984). Users, depending on their needs, their knowledge and skills, but 
also depending on situational factors (e.g. accessibility of recipient, diffusion and acceptability 
of technology within community or organization) (Markus, 1994), develop their own way of 
how to make use of the technology. The social structures that emerge from the interaction with 
the technology therefore are related to the properties of the technological artefact (e.g. feature 
of a groupware software that allows the anonymous posting of comments), to the type of task 
with which is dealt (e.g. level of complexity), to the knowledge, assumptions and expectations 
of its users (e.g. familiarity with task or technology), and to the existing social structures (e.g. 
habits, norms, values, and power relations) of the community and organization of which the 
users are part (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994; Orlikowski, 2000).  
For the purpose of this study, ideas of structuration are very insightful. Social structure 
enables and constrains conversational practices, and is continuously consolidated, but also 
changed through these same recurring practices. We have argued earlier that we make sense, 
create, share, and integrate knowledge in social interactions and particularly in face-to-face 
conversations. Put in Gidden’s terms, that means that we use the social structures that emerge 
in our recurring conversations as the interpretive schemes for our sense-making and for the 
way experts and decision makers integrate knowledge. The question that emerges regarding 
the relation between knowledge integration, conversations, and conversational tools is there-
fore whether the ways that technology is enacted alters in any form the conversational prac-
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tices and whether these new conversational forms represent a more suited frame for the inte-
gration of knowledge. More precisely, the question is whether the appropriation of the tool 
leads to conversational practices that better cope with the communicational challenges of 
turn-taking, big picture, common ground, and conflict, whose successful handling are defining 
elements of the knowledge integration processes as we discussed earlier on.  
An appropriation or enactment of a technology is not immediate, but involves a more 
or less time-intensive process of various iterating activities. Orlikowski et al. (1995) discussed 
such mediating activities, among which activities of establishment (institute technology physi-
cally and socially, define physical parameters of technology, convince people of its necessity, 
set up roles and guidelines for use), of reinforcement (maintain operational fidelity, help users 
to adopt), of adjustment (alter technical features and usage rules), and activities of episodic 
change (redesign technical features, modify institutional properties of organization). Important 
aspects within theses activities are the characteristics of the individuals who promote or use 
the technology (i.e. their centrality within the social network of the organization, their formal 
power), or the organizational situation into which the technology is introduced (i.e. part of a 
larger change initiative). Technology is thus not enacted at once and its moderating influence 
on the process of knowledge integration should be studied within an – at least – medium time-
frame. 
On the other hand, the first impression and experiences are decisive for whether people 
feel committed to continue working with the technology. When establishing the new technol-
ogy physically and socially within the institution, its initiators and promoters have to engage in 
an organizational discourse about the technology; they have to continuously argue for the 
technology’s role, persuade managers, discuss the idea, and solicit feedback (Orlikowski et al., 
1995: 440; Swanson, 2003). Yet, a very determining argument in this organizational discourse 
is the first contact with the technology itself. If users’ first impression is that the technology is 
complicated in its employment or does not bring an immediate and apparent benefit, it is most 
likely that the managers and potential users will not consider it any further unless they have a 
strong incentive or pressure to do so. This study only examines such a first use of a specific 
technology. It will provide a first empirical test of the immediate benefits of the use of an in-
teractive visualization tool on the process of knowledge integration and gives an answer to the 
question whether using the tool in a first moment leads to changes in the conversation process, 
which are favourable for knowledge integration. Certainly, conversation partners will not im-
mediately alter their implicit guiding rules for leading conversations and their interaction 
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structures will remain the same. Yet, a first contact with the technology makes them try out 
alternative conversational patterns and processes. The features and the spirit (DeSanctis & 
Poole, 1994; DeSanctis et al., 1994) of the tool, as understood by the participants of a conver-
sation, confronts them with different, more or less explicit rules how to handle group partici-
pation, conflict, the establishment and sustaining of the big picture and of the common ground 
in our conversations. In a rather playful manner, they can try out these proposed rules and re-
sources and see whether they bring them any benefits. This benefit perceived of the technol-
ogy in its first uses will be determinant for whether people continue to be motivated to further 
use and enact the tool.  
The Use of Visualizations in Conversations 
The idea to use interactive visual support in conversations to enhance understanding is 
very old. Stafford refers to the frequent use of visuals to accompany conversations on knowl-
edge-intensive issues already in the eighteenth century: Instruments, images, toys, prepara-
tions, cosmorama, or frontispieces were used as “interactive and flowing systems for under-
standing which were based on an ephemeral act of creation and which we now know as con-
versations” (Stafford, 1994: 25). Stafford outlines that the modus operandi of a conversation is 
very close to the one of the interaction with a visual.  
In today’s conversations and meetings, we still use many of the instruments that were 
popular then, but we have developed new ones, some of which are bound to the recent im-
provements in information and communication technologies (ICT) and have led to additional 
possibilities in the use of visualization. Next to handouts, sketches on flipcharts or black-
boards, printed images and figures or physical models, participants of a conversation use me-
dia as overhead projectors, computer beamers, interactive softboards, touch screens, 
(streamed) audio-video, etc. These new media allow for new possibilities in supporting meet-
ings that go beyond visualization (i.e. immediate access to the necessary information through 
databases, the real-time testing of scenarios, the inclusion of conversation partners that are 
physically distant, participative decision making through voting structures). Visuals have be-
come more dynamic and can be easily constructed in a collaborative and interactive manner. 
In addition, the combinations and back and forth switches from electronic to physical presen-
tations mark subtle changes in fluidity (in the electronic format, issues can be easily changed, 
if printed out, they become more official, decided and binding). Finally, an instant visual 
documentation of meetings and conversations and a company-wide distribution of these vis-
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ual-minutes has become possible (Mengis & Eppler, 2005b). Figure 3 shows an example of an 
interactive visual tool, which is designed to support the knowledge creation (idea generation) 
and structuring in conversations. 
 
Figure 3: Example of an Collaborative Visual Tool -  
Mindjet MindManager Pro 6 (www.mindjet.com)  
In spite of these new possibilities in enhancing conversations, the scientific discussion 
on the use of collaborative visuals for face-to-face conversations has remained rather limited. 
Researchers have mainly focused on computer mediated communication (CMC) and on con-
versations of geographically dispersed interaction partners (i.e. online conversations through 
chat applications). In this context, a main interest has been to find ways to make up for the 
lacking visual and social cues by leaving a persistent trace of the conversation and allowing 
for correctibility (Bregman & Haythornthwaite, 2001). Also in the face-to-face context, there 
are a few examples of gaining persistence in conversations by using visualization (Lyons et 
al., 2004; Waibel et al., 1998). Yet, the major reasons for visualizing face-to-face conversa-
tions are to display the “thinking” of the conversation partners, respectively to depict casual 
arguments and relationships of concepts (Conklin, 2006; Conklin & Begeman, 1988). Visuali-
zation can also be used to make peripherical social information tangible (DiMicco et al., 
2004), or to visualize the human voice (Levin & Lieberman, 2004).  
In the following, we will discuss the role of collaborative visualization for the pre-
sented model for knowledge integration. In particular, we will refer to a type of interactivity 
and visualization as it is provided by the software suite ‘let’s focus’ (for a more detailed de-
scription of this tool, see: methods/tool). We do so since we have worked with let’s focus for 
the empirical evaluation of the model for knowledge integration and for assessing the modera-
tion effect of the tool. 
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We claim that the use of the visual tool has a positive moderation effect on the model 
for knowledge integration (see: Figure 4) and propose four moderation hypotheses. In particu-
lar, we propose that experts and decision makers, who use an interactive visual tool (like let’s 
focus) for their conversations, rely more on the creation of the big picture (Hm1) and the 
common ground (Hm2) in their knowledge integration efforts and less so on conflict (and if it 
arises, they manage to deal with it in a more constructive way) (Hm3) and equal participation 
(Hm4). Instead, in the non-supported condition, experts and decision makers, when aiming to 
integrate their specialized knowledge by unsupported conversations, the challenges of creating 
a big picture and a common ground are only difficultly to be met so that conversation partners 
rely more on equal participation and conflict in their attempts to integrate knowledge. Yet, 
they do not manage to handle with conflict in a constructive way, which is why, overall, their 
integration capacity is smaller in the non-supported condition than for conversation partners 
working with an interactive visual tool. We therewith claim that the use of an interactive vis-
ual tool has a positive moderation effect on a relational level of the presented model for 
knowledge integration (and not on a level of the means). 
In the following, we will outline all four moderation hypotheses.  
Figure 4: Moderation Effect of the Use of Interactive Visual Tools (Hm1, Hm2, Hm3, Hm4) 
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Moderation Hypothesis One (Hm1): With the support of the visual tool, integration efforts 
rely more on the facilitated construction of common ground 
Several studies have argued for the importance of shared visual spaces in creating 
common ground among interaction partners who need to integrate knowledge (see for exam-
ple: Bechky, 2003; see for example: Carlile, 2002). According to Carlile, a visual (which in his 
view is a specific instance of a boundary object) can become a shared resource and a common 
reference point and can help to establish a shared language among people and represent their 
knowledge so that they can better understand differences and communalities of their under-
standings (Carlile, 2002). Other studies focus more explicitly on conversations and discuss the 
role of visuals in establishing a common ground (Kraut et al., 2003; Olson & Olson, 2000). 
They found - by confronting co-located interaction situations with geographically dispersed 
settings – that communicative grounding is facilitated significantly in the dislocated situation 
if interlocutors can use visual support (e.g. through video communication systems) (Kraut et 
al., 2003; Olson & Olson, 2000). We believe that also in the co-located situation, the use of 
interactive visuals facilitates the construction of common ground since they provide additional 
physical co-presence. Conversation partners will therefore rely more on this facilitated con-
struction of common ground in their attempts to integrate knowledge.  
Interaction partners can refer to these shared visual objects by using deictic speech 
(words like ‘this’ ‘there’ ‘I’ ‘then’ that have no fixed meaning, but that point to a person, 
place, or time and are conferred with meaning by the communicative context, Jesperson called 
them ‘shifters’ (Jespersen, 1922)). Since the visuals are dynamic and can be changed through-
out the conversation process, the refinement and correction processes (that are most important 
for grounding activities) can be achieved not only through verbal communication, but are also 
supported through the interactively developed visual. Reviewing the current state of the visual, 
a conversation partner might see that an identified problem (e.g. technological change), which 
was categorized as an external problem, should instead be viewed as an internal problem (e.g. 
the real problem is that they do not have processes in place that are flexible enough to swiftly 
adapt to technological change). The interactive visual permits interlocutors ‘reviewability’ (i.e. 
they can re-examine each other’s messages), which is an important aspect for building com-
mon ground (Clark & Brennan, 1991). In addition to reviewability, these authors listed a set of 
characteristics of communication formats (e.g. co-presence, visibility, audibility, contemporal-
ity), which allow for the construction of common ground (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Kraut et al., 
2003). These are:   
  30
• Co-presence: interlocutors share the same physical environment 
• Visibility: communicators are visible to each other 
• Audibility: interlocutors can communicate through speech 
• Contemporality: message is received the moment it is sent 
• Simultaneity: all communicators can send and receive at the same time 
• Sequentiality: turns cannot get out of sequence 
• Reviewability: communicators are able to re-examine each other’s messages 
• Revisability: one can modify messages before they are sent 
Clark and Brennan argued that while face-to-face conversations are characterized by 
most of the above listed aspects (and therefore represent a very apt communicational form for 
building common ground), they do not allow for reviewability and revisability (Clark & Bren-
nan, 1991). Yet, when working with interactive templates that visually summarize the argu-
ments and topics that are brought in during the conversation, interaction partners have the pos-
sibility to review others’ arguments and refine their understanding even at a later stage.  
Next to enhancing the referencing to physical objects and to providing reviewability, 
interactive visuals facilitate grounding also because they provide communicators with an addi-
tional, often metaphoric language (Kraut et al., 2003). Visual language can help conversation 
partners to articulate aspects that are implicit and hard to define (Meyer, 1991). This is espe-
cially the case for visuals that rely on metaphors. Nonaka and his colleagues argue that the use 
of metaphors is key in the externalization phase (i.e. when people engage in the difficult proc-
ess of giving an explicit form to tacit knowledge) since metaphors permit to understand one 
thing by imagining another (Nonaka & Konno, 1998; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka et 
al., 2000). Having at disposition a visual metaphor (i.e. a bridge, a labyrinth, a scale, or a 
ruler), interlocutors refer to an already existing common ground between them. The attach-
ment of abstract, unknown, and complex concepts and relationships (i.e. the topic (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980)) on the visual vehicle of the metaphor represents a clever way how to use the 
existing common ground in order to extend it. In this way, conversation partners can commu-
nicate something domain specific, abstract, or something that is hard to grasp with words by 
using the specific and well known concept of the metaphoric vehicle (Inns, 2002). They can 
use the visual language and the conceptual domain of the metaphor, which are common 
ground to all participants. Participants of a conversation can, for example, place an identified 
problem at the very bottom of an iceberg or put two solutions close to each other. In these ex-
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amples, the interlocutors can express the difficulty to access a particular problem or the relat-
edness of two types of solutions through the visual positioning of the concepts on the visual 
metaphor. The visual language helps them to express aspects, which are difficult to put in 
words.  
Finally, the visual language provides not only additional means for the expression of 
difficult issues; it also facilitates the understanding process. Images are said to afford a more 
direct access to meaning (Meyer, 1991). If information that is unfamiliar to people is visual-
ized on a well-known object (like, for example, on a funnel, a boat, or a ladder, and, to less 
extent, also on a diagram like the Ansoff-matrix or a Strategy Map), people can quite intui-
tively explore the meaning of the unfamiliar and of the aspects that are not yet common 
ground (see also: Inns, 2002).  
The use of visuals in conversations gives interlocutors the possibility to use the exist-
ing common ground among them and to extend it to new conceptual domains. In doing so, 
visuals facilitate both the expression of issues that are abstract, complex, and hard to express 
in words as also their understanding. Because the use of visual tools makes it easier for experts 
and decision makers to construct a common ground among them, they will give more weight 
to it when integrating their knowledge than those interacting without a visual support.   
Moderation Hypothesis Two (Hm2): With the support of the visual tool, integration efforts 
rely more on the facilitated construction and perpetuation of the big picture  
Interactive visuals (as the ones provided by the software suite let’s focus) allow con-
versation partners to visually document the synthesis of important arguments of their conver-
sations and to structure them through the categories provided by the image. At the same time, 
the participants of a conversation also have the possibility to link, to this synthetic overview, 
more detailed information or reasons-why of a certain standpoint through the comment func-
tion of the tool. In this way, the visual tool helps to keeping the difficult balance between 
overview and detail, which is necessary for the creation and perpetuation of the big picture. 
Visuals that are developed within the curse of the conversation help participants to 
keep in mind the current state of the conversation and serve as a mnemonic device of what has 
been discussed earlier on and what are the still missing themes in the conversation. Kraut, Fus-
sel, and Siegel state that “visual information helps people maintain up-to-date mental models 
or situational awareness of the state of the task and other’s activities. This awareness can help 
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them plan what to say or do next and to coordinate their utterances and actions with those of 
their partners” (Kraut et al., 2003: 15). Dynamic visuals serve as an artefact around which in-
terlocutors can coordinate their contributions, both in terms of time and content. They are con-
stantly reminded of the overall picture to which they contribute with their single statements. 
They can see what has been said before and what topics have not been touched so far in their 
discussion. In this way, the visual helps to maintain the big picture and the participants of a 
conversation can understand how the specific contributions relate to the overall topic.  
Visuals are important for gaining and keeping the big picture also because they support 
systemic thinking and focusing on the interconnections, rather than the parts. Dimond and 
Beaumont (1974), Kosslyn (1978), and Maruyama (1986), as quoted by Meyer (1991), all ar-
gued that cognitive operations on images do not require their decomposition into single ele-
ments. In view of an image, people are inclined to think of the interrelationships between 
components rather than engaging in fragmentary thinking (Meyer, 1991). In a visual, the logic 
of presentation is not sequential. Various information elements are outlined in space and pre-
sented simultaneously. Meyer therefore argues that visuals serve for simultaneous processing 
of a variety of information and help to keep more information items in mind (Meyer, 1991: 
222). Seeing various elements placed next to each other, conversation partners are invited to 
think whether there is a relationship between these and what the nature of such a relationship 
could be. If this visual is a framework that provides an all-embracing structure (which can be 
based on a metaphor or on a more abstract representation) along which interlocutors can posi-
tion their contributions, the capability to interconnect and see the big picture is even more 
strongly enhanced (Vincent & Rosse, 2001). Finally, the work with interactive visual tools is a 
sort of a mapping activity, in which the important arguments are place on visual metaphors or 
on other visual support such as diagrams, tables or coordinate systems. Huff and Jenkins (Huff 
& Jenkins, 2002) mentioned that working with mapping techniques brings advantages such as, 
among others, connecting and organizing knowledge, or representing knowledge on different 
levels of abstraction. Using visual tools thus helps to interconnect, to think systemically, to 
better differentiate between the various levels of abstraction, and to create and maintain the big 
picture of a conversation. Being the creation of the big picture facilitated in the tool condition, 
experts and decision makers rely more on the big picture in integrating their knowledge. 
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Moderation Hypothesis Three (Hm3): With the support of the visual tool, integration ef-
forts rely less on conflict and deal with it in a more constructive way 
Conversation partners, who manage to have a necessary common ground among them 
and, second, are capable of seeing and maintaining the big picture of the issue of decision 
throughout the conversation process, need to refer less to conflict when integrating their 
knowledge. For example, if an interlocutor A holds another opinion or view than interlocutor 
B, but if both of them see the big picture of the issue, they have a better chance to see that their 
opposition might be resolved a higher level of abstraction. Similarly, if A knows interlocutor 
B well (that is they share a large common ground), but, on a specific issue, B disagrees with 
A, A might easily induce the reasons and motivations behind B’s disagreement and develop an 
understanding for it. He/she can also more easily refer to these reasons and motivations and 
resolve the disagreement on this level. In this way, conversation partners who are interacting 
with the tool, mainly integrate their knowledge through common ground and big picture and 
task conflict is a less important element in the integration process.  
We claim that, in the tool condition, conflict is not only less important for the integra-
tion of knowledge, interlocutors are also capable of dealing more constructively with arising 
conflict2. This means that conversation partners will report a moderate level of task conflict 
and do not mistake it for relationship conflict (low correlation). Visualizing standpoints and 
assertions increases the critical capability of the interlocutors. Cecez-Kecmanovic and Dal-
maris (2000) found that when people can see the representation of a collective understanding 
or opinion, they can recognize the possible discrepancies with their own understanding. Such 
differences in opinion and inconsistencies in understanding are usually quite hard to detect, 
but become more apparent through the visual depiction. Participants can critically review the 
various elements and the relationships among them if they are visually outlined in front of 
them. Instead of an uncritical acknowledgement of facts, the visual leads to a certain amount 
of task conflict. Yet, the handling of this conflict is collaborative. The framing that the interac-
tive visual provides is a one of integration: all contributions are potentially part of the same 
image. There is nothing beyond that image that could not be integrated and disagreements are 
only different perspectives of the same picture. In a subtle way, such an integrative image cre-
ates a more collaborative spirit among the conversation partners. Dichotomous (either-or) rea-
                                                 
2 Other important factors for dealing more constructively with conflict are the creation of within-team trust 
(Simons & Peterson, 2000) or introducing interactional rules as focusing in the debate on facts and multiplying 
alternatives and to enrich the level of debate (Eisenhardt et al., 2000). Furthermore, specific tools, like the self-
assessment-tool proposed by Drucker, are said to help communicators to more openly listen to each other and to 
deal more constructively with conflict (Drucker, 1994). 
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soning (Tannen, 1999) and defensive arguing (Argyris, 1996) can be contained and with that 
the non-constructive handling of conflict. What in addition fosters a constructive handling of 
conflict is when conversation partners switch from one visual support to another. They can 
frame, for example, a negotiation situation as a pie for which the total value is defined upfront 
and of which each party tries to get the biggest piece. Alternatively, the same situation can be 
viewed as a bridge. In this frame, each party starts with a departing situation and can create 
additional value by building on the bridging, common interests. A change in the visual support 
permits conversation partners to alter their perspective on the issue and to re-frame their think-
ing (Inns, 2002). By doing so, they realize that their perspective is, to some degree, contingent, 
which leads them to approach differences of opinion in a more collaborative spirit.  
Finally, by visualizing arguments and standpoints, these concepts receive a certain 
physical reality and are to some extent dissociated to the people who put them forward. The 
risk is thus lower to take a critique on an issue personally and to misunderstand a task conflict 
on a relational level. The correlation between relationship and task conflict is therefore lower. 
In sum, we claim that interlocutors, who interact with the support of a visual tool, refer less to 
conflict in order to integrate their knowledge and if they do so, they deal with it in a more con-
structive manner.  
Moderation Hypothesis Four (Hm4): With the support of the visual tool, integration efforts 
rely less on the equal participation of all conversation partners 
We have argued that an equal participation of all conversation partners is a basic re-
flection of knowledge integration. In both conditions (tool and non-tool), if a certain conversa-
tion partner does not participate at the conversation process, his/her knowledge cannot be inte-
grated to a group knowledge. In this sense, equal participation remains important in both con-
ditions. There are visualization tools for face-to-face conversation that visualize the peripheri-
cal social cues of the conversation like for example the amount of contributions of each inter-
locutor (DiMicco & Hollenbach, 2006; DiMicco et al., 2004; Sack, 2000). DiMicco and her 
colleagues (2004) found that in a co-located setting, providing visual cues on the amount of 
contributions of each conversation partner made much-talkers limit their amount of contribu-
tions and equilibrated participation. Since the visualization tool, which was employed for this 
experiment, does not visualize such social cues, we would not expect such an effect. Yet, we 
stipulate a similar effect like for the conflict construct. If the participants of a conversation do 
see the big picture of an issue, they more or less know which aspects they still need to discuss, 
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which information is missing, and where they have to develop novel approaches. In this sense, 
even if there were some more-talkers and less-talkers in the discussion, this is not forcibly 
seen as a threat to knowledge integration. The orientation on the conversational process is thus 
tightly bound to the content and scope of the discussion so that the strict distribution of the 
turns taken by the conversation partners is perceived to be less important for the integration of 
knowledge. Without the tool, conversation partners are more sensitive to interactional justice 
such as equal participation (Bies & Moag, 1986).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To summarize, we stipulate that the visualization software has a positive moderating 
effect on a level of the relationships of our model and not on the level of the means. We claim 
that, in the tool condition, conversation partners integrate their knowledge mainly through the 
establishment of ‘big picture’ and a ‘common ground’ and that conflict and equal participation 
carry less weight (see: Figure 5). For the non-tool condition (see: Figure 6), we find the oppo-
site situation. Because of a lack of common ground and big picture, interlocutors give more 
importance to conflict and equal participation. We further claim that, in the non-supported 
situation, interlocutors deal with conflict in a less constructive way for that relationship con-
flict and task conflict are more strongly correlated (moderate task conflict, moderate relation-
ship conflict, and low correlation between them are forming constructive conflict, see: 
Operationalization of Research Variables and Measurement Model). Finally, there is a 
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stronger relation between knowledge integration and decision commitment in the tool condi-
tion (2nd level integration).  
Methods 
In the following, we will present a first empirical evaluation of the communicative 
model for knowledge integration and of the proposed moderation effect of the use of the inter-
active visual tool on the model. For this first evaluation, we conducted a class room experi-
ment. 
Design and Participants  
The class room experiment involves a preference task (DeSanctis, 1987), in which sub-
jects have to make a selection of alternatives for which there is no objective criterion of a cor-
rect answer. We use a between-subjects single factor group design, varying only the mode of 
communication (tool groups and non-tool groups). There are sixteen groups in total, eight 
groups per condition, and each group is formed by four subjects (a total of 64 respondents, 32 
per condition). Each group consists of two “experts” and two “managers” and students are 
randomly assigned to the groups and their function within the group. Participants were under-
graduate students in communication science that follow a strategy or knowledge management 
course.  
Task  
The preference task is based on a hidden profile scenario3 (Stasser, 1992; Stasser & 
Stewart, 1992), in which there exists an information asymmetry between the single members 
                                                 
3 The hidden profile setting, i.e. the information asymmetry and explicit role assignments (Stasser et al., 
2000) had the mere function to establish the role of the expert and the one of the decision maker. We did not 
pursue the classical objective of hidden profile studies, which is to analyze whether conversation partners have 
an inclination to share and consider information that is already shared among them (and to consider uniquely 
held information to a lesser extent). The mere difference in information and the explicit attribution of roles do 
not make a person to become an expert nor a manager. In fact, the language, mental models, past experiences, 
and the implicit knowledge of these ‘experts’ and ‘decision makers’ certainly do not differ in the way they do in 
a natural condition. Such a procedure though has been used in other experimental settings (Stasser et al., 2000) 
and we could suppose that if we can observe the said communicational challenges of knowledge integration 
already in this attenuated situation, they would be more blatant in a “real world” context. 
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of the group. In order to be able to make satisfying choices and to have enough information on 
the presented alternatives, conversation partners have to pool the unshared items.  
Students receive a case study4 on a small-medium enterprise (SME) and its knowledge 
management projects, some of which it intended to implement. On the basis of the case study, 
students have to decide which three of the five project proposal they would choose for actual 
implementation. Half of the students receive a version of the case that provides more informa-
tion on the knowledge management projects (expert version) whereas the other half obtains 
more strategic, corporate information (decision maker version) (see: Appendix 1 and 
Appendix 2 for the two case versions). In total, the cases contain 12 information cues on cor-
porate and strategy issues (of which only 3 are exposed in the expert version) and 52 cues on 
the knowledge management projects (of which only 11 are included in the manager version) 
(see: Appendix 3 for a comparative listing of the information cues for both case versions). 
Each group is formed of two experts (students who have read the expert version of the case), 
and two decision makers (who have read the management version). During the one hour ex-
periment, students are asked to identify with the roles attributed to them through the case study 
and to imitate a one hour meeting.  
In this meeting, two experts present five knowledge management measures and the 
CEO with another manager decide, which three of the five measures to actually implement. In 
the first half hour, in order to better understand the context, into which the knowledge man-
agement measures shall be implemented, the groups are asked to discuss the corporate objec-
tives and problems of the company. They have to elaborate four criteria by which they will 
evaluate and choose the knowledge management measures. In the second part of the meeting, 
the students have to present, discuss, and evaluate the five proposed knowledge management 
measures. Finally, the two managers have to decide (by consultation of the experts), which 
three of the five measures to further pursue and implement. Figure 7 and Figure 8 outline ex-
emplary solutions for the first and second part of the task, yet there is no one best solution for 
the given task. We used the software tools, with which half of the groups worked, as a visual 
support for the presentation of these solutions. 
The task we have developed for the experiment had to satisfy the following criteria. 
First, the task needs to well imitate a real world problem and represent a good instance of a 
domain expert-decision maker interaction. It needs to be a problem, in which, decision makers 
                                                 
4 For the original case study, see: (Eppler, 2002). 
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typically draw in experts for consultation. In such a situation, neither the experts nor the deci-
sion makers alone could have taken an informed decision. Decision makers call in experts only 
if they have to take a decision in a rather complex and uncertain environment where there is no 
one best solution. The task therefore needs to show a considerable level of complexity. In ad-
dition, we wanted to imitate the time pressure aspect, which is a major challenge in the expert-
decision maker interaction. Finally, we were looking for a task, in which subjects already have 
some prior knowledge so that they can potentially bring into the discussion somewhat more 
implicit knowledge and not only report the explicit items from the case study. Since the re-
spondents would be students that follow either a knowledge management or a strategy course, 
the task had to do with knowledge management, project management, and with strategy im-
plementation.  
Tool 
The software tool we were using for the experiments is called let’s focus Positioner 
and is part of the software package let’s focus. The objective of let’s focus is to support 
knowledge processes of individuals or groups by using interactive visualization methods. In 
particular, all applications of let’s focus are thought to support face-to-face conversations as 
also computer mediated interactions.  
The software has been developed conceptually by the authors and by the Reflact Inc., a 
German company developing and using new media for organizational development, which 
technically and graphically developed the tool. The software is based on Flash und Java tech-
nologies and uses XML standards for data formats and format conversions. It has been used in 
various organizations, including reinsurance groups, logistics providers, banks, and universi-
ties. Conceptually, let’s focus is based on approaches of knowledge visualization, metaphor 
theory, Gestalt theory, and also on morphological research (let's-focus, 2006). 
let’s focus can be used as a support in various settings. It is said to support the facilita-
tion of workshops, virtual meetings, interactive presentations, training seminars, and can also 
be used in more individualistic problem-solving situations (let's-focus, 2006). As a communi-
cation device, the producers claim that the tool helps to overcome communication fallacies as 
“circular discussions, suboptimal use of time, insufficient fact-checking and hazardous and 
rashly conclusions, misunderstandings, and unfruitful conflict” (Reflact & Eppler, 2005). Yet, 
the aim of let’s focus is not only to serve as a communication device, but also to provide 
frames and conceptual structures for approaching specific task types like evaluative tasks (e.g. 
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client- or competitor assessments, option evaluations) or more general analytic tasks (e.g. 
problem analysis, stakeholder analysis) and also planning tasks (e.g. project or campaign plan-
ning meetings). In order to support these various tasks, the software package includes four 
tools: the let’s focus Timeliner, the let’s focus Ruler, the let’s focus Tracker, and the let’s focus 
Positioner (for an overview on the various tools, see: Appendix 4 ). 
The let’s focus Positioner is the tool we have used for the experiment. The Positioner 
is intended to support groups to share information, analyze complex issues and to structure the 
integration of various types of information. The tool provides a large library of interactive and 
in part animated templates of diagrams and metaphors along which the user can position ob-
jects such as textboxes and symbols and visually underlie the relation between them. The tool 
includes functionalities of clustering, annotation, replay, levelling, and overlaying, all of them 
using simple drag and drop logics and which allow users to visualize their thinking and com-
munication processes.  
A description of the specific features of let’s focus Positioner can be found in 
Appendix 5. We will limit ourselves to present only one distinguishing feature of the applica-
tion, which is that its user (e.g. the moderator of a meeting) can choose between a variety of 
backgrounds and templates. These represent diagrams (i.e. Fishbone, Balanced Scorecard, 
Five Forces, Value Chain, or Ansoff Matrix) or visual metaphors (i.e. a radar, an iceberg, a 
bridge, geographical maps, a ladder, a pyramid, a wheel, or a funnel). The templates combine 
such a background visual with some default text-fields and objects and provide more guided 
structure in approaching specific tasks such as, for example, a stakeholder analysis. The idea is 
that the individual or group selects a visual guideline or cognitive and communicative frame 
with which to approach and structure an issue or conversation. Since these frames are visible 
to all conversation partners, they are likely to provide a common ground and language to all 
the participants of a conversation and facilitate understanding.  
For the experiment, we prepared two templates, one for the corporate discussion and 
elaboration of evaluation criteria, the second for the evaluation of the proposed measures. 
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Figure 7: Template (Based on a Compound Metaphor) and Exemplary Solution for the First Part 
of the Task: Understanding Corporate Objectives, Problems and Defining Evaluation 
Criteria 
The first template (see: Figure 7) is based on the visual metaphor including a sailing 
boat that is floating in the sea. It is guided by the light of a lighthouse and is threatened by 
underwater icebergs. The template invites interlocutors to place the organization’s internal 
problems in the bow of the ship, the external threats on the iceberg, the objectives of the com-
pany on the lighthouse’s light beam and, finally, the criteria for the evaluation of the knowl-
edge management measures in the middle of the picture, on the sails.  
The second template (see: Figure 8) is more analytic and includes a table that allows 
for evaluating how good each knowledge management measure corresponds to the previously 
developed evaluation criteria. On the left row of the table of Figure 8, evaluation criteria are 
transferred and on the upper cells. 
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Figure 8:  Template and Exemplary Solution for the Second Part of the Task: Evaluating Proposals 
of Five Knowledge Management Projects 
Setting 
All groups are sitting in a small lecturing room on a square table, the two ‘experts’ on 
one side, the ‘managers’ on the other, but all facing each other. The groups of the tool-
supported condition have a notebook and a mouse placed on the table, which can be handled 
by one of the group members (see: Figure 9). To facilitate the visibility of graphic template, 
the computer screen is projected by a beamer. All groups are audio and videotaped during the 
one hour interaction.  
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Figure 9: Group Conversing with the Use of let’s focus Positioner 
Pretest 
The initial questionnaire was reviewed by an expert on experimental design and was 
tested on five people before we conducted the pre-test experiment. First changes were taken 
into consideration.  
In order to test the design, procedure, and questionnaire of the experiment, we con-
ducted a pre-test with an executive master class of 32 students (8 groups). At this stage, we 
handed out the case study just 30 minutes prior to the experiment and gave only a very brief 
introduction to the tool. Also, the task was more complex and involved an hour discussion that 
was divided in three parts: 1. sharing corporate information and elaboration of evaluation cri-
teria for the knowledge management measures (with the support of the let’s focus Positioner); 
2. sharing of project information and deciding three knowledge management measures to im-
plement (with the support of the let’s focus Positioner); 3. planning action steps for imple-
menting the decision (with the support of the let’s focus Timeliner). The students had 20 min-
utes for each task.  
At the end of the experiment, we held a plenary discussion with all the participants and 
asked feedback on the task, on the use of the tool, and on the questionnaire. We analyzed the 
questionnaires and changed the few questions to which several people hadn’t responded. We 
also analyzed the outcome of the questionnaires and found moderate confirmatory results on 
most variables.  
  43
From the insights gained through the observation during the task, the results of the 
questionnaires and the plenary feedback session, we slightly changed procedure, task and 
questionnaire of the experiment. First, students should be more strongly familiarized with the 
tool. We decided that all students (the ones who will use the tool and the ones who will not) 
would receive a brief conceptual and practical introduction to the tool and they would use the 
tool in a task in the days and lesson previous to the experiment. Second, we would make them 
read the case study not right before the experiment, but would give it as homework for the day 
of the experiment. In the pre-test, the overall time schedule was very tight and the overall time 
request quite long (together with the reading of the case and the plenary discussion). We real-
ized that students were quite tired and less motivated at the end. For the same reason of time 
and motivation, we shortened the task of the experiment and skipped the third part. That also 
brought the advantage that students had to use only one tool of the let’s focus suite (Posi-
tioner) and were able to focus more on the task and less on the learning of the tool. Finally, we 
made some changes in the questionnaire, we added some questions for the big picture con-
struct, the common ground construct, and included some control questions on the level of fa-
miliarity with the task. 
Procedure 
After pre-testing questionnaire and procedure, we conducted the experiment in the fol-
lowing way. By email or in a lesson prior to the training for the experiment, students were 
asked to confirm their participation at the experiment. Two lessons before the day of the ex-
periment, all students (independently of whether they were part of tool or non-tool group) re-
ceived a brief introduction to the tool (ideas behind it, possible uses, how to use it). Students 
also had to do an exercise for homework with the tool that they then had to present in class. In 
this way, we were able to assure that students have some familiarity in the use of the tool. A 
day or as a maximum a week before the experiment, the students received the 5- respectively 
8-page case study, which they had to read for the day of the experiment. They were urged not 
to share information among them prior to the experiment.  
The day of the experiment, students were split into groups and received 10 minutes to 
again scan through the case study. The single groups were reminded that they were now part 
of a living case study and found themselves in a one-hour meeting in which they had to share 
information and make several decisions. For the tool groups, the supervisor also showed which 
visual template to use for the first part of the meeting and which for the second part. The 
  44
groups working with the tool chose one participant of the conversation to handle the tool and 
visualize the contributions of all members along the discussion. After the one hour discussion, 
the groups were asked to collectively fill in a form in which they had to outline which projects 
they had chosen and argue why they had chosen them. In addition, they were asked to fill in a 
questionnaire, which took 15 minutes for compilation. 
Operationalization of Research Variables and Measurement Model 
All research variables are measured using multi-item scales (see Appendix 7 for origi-
nal scales and Table 1 for adjusted scales after assessment of psychometric properties).  
We have developed own scales for the constructs of Common Ground, Big Picture, and 
Decision Commitment and relied on already developed scales for Equal Participation (Murthy 
& Kerr, 2003) (to which we added some additional items), Content and Relationship Conflict 
(Pearson, 2002).  
Equal Participation 
We have measured the equal participation construct with a 3-item scale including the 
following items: 1. There was an adequate participation from all members of the group; 2. 
There were one or two people who dominated the discussion, and 3. The other members of my 
group paid attention to the comments I made. We borrowed item 1. from Murthy and Kerr 
(2003) and added 2. and 3. We have introduced item 3 since equal participation is not only 
about making turns and actively contributing to the conversation. It is also about whether these 
contributions are actually considered and whether participation on behalf of the listeners (not 
only the speakers) is equal. If all participants engage in equal turn taking, but nobody listens 
nor takes into account what participant A says, the turn taking might be equal, but not so the 
participation. 
Big Picture 
To our knowledge, the big picture challenge has not been object of empirical studies 
that applied quantitative measurement methods. For this reason, we have developed an 6-item 
scale based on the insights we gained from the explorative case studies from the conceptuali-
zation in the existing literature (Gasper & Clore, 2002; Harkins, 1999; Rhodes, 1991; Ringach, 
2003). The scale reflects a communicative, process oriented view on the big picture challenge 
and consists of the following items: 1. The conversation process was very clear; 2. We never 
  45
lost time on discussing irrelevant issues; 3. We never lost time on too detailed discussions; 4. I 
always knew how a specific contribution related to the more general topic of the discussion; 5. 
At every point in time I knew why the group was discussing a specific issue; and 6. I knew at 
every point in time where we were in the discussion. As a response scale, we have used the 5-
point Likert scale ranging from (0=”strongly agree”) to 4 (=”strongly disagree”). The scale 
was pilot-tested using a sample of 32 respondents and fine-tuned in the following.  
Common Ground 
As is the case for the big picture construct, we are not aware of an empirical study in 
which common ground was measured quantitatively. Again, on the basis of the insights drawn 
from our explorative case studies and of the existing literature (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Clark 
& Marshall, 1981; Krauss & Fussell, 1991), we have developed an own measurement scale. 
We wanted it to reflect three elements that we think are important for the common ground 
construct. First, the differences or communalities in language use were often reported in the 
case studies as a proxy for a whole set of differences such as knowledge background, training, 
everyday context, personal perspectives and values. Second, the concept should enclose 
whether the participants managed to enlarge the intersection of their specialized knowledge 
sets and integrate it in order to create a shared understanding. Finally, the scale should reflect 
the interlocutors’ capacity to put themselves in the perspective of the others (Krauss & Fussell, 
1998) and adapt their messages to it. We formulated the resulting 3-item scale as follows: 1. 
During the conversation, the group developed and shared a common language to deal with the 
task; 2. During the conversation, the group created a shared and deep understanding of the 
topic; and 3. I could now better adjust my communication style to the other members of the 
group. As a response scale, we have worked with the 5-point Likert scale ranging from 0 
(=”strongly agree”) to 4 (=”strongly disagree”). 
Constructive Conflict 
We have bound constructive conflict to three conditions: 1. moderate task conflict (in-
verted u-curve relationship), 2. low relationship conflict, 3. low correlation between task and 
relationship conflict (see: Constructive Conflict). In order to avoid a third order latent variable, 
we do not introduce constructive conflict as a second order latent variable for the statistical 
analysis, but work directly with task conflict, relationship conflict, and the correlation between 
this two constructs. 
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For the measurement of the two interrelated conflict constructs, we relied on Pearson, 
Ensley, and Amason’s (Pearson, 2002) 6-item scale. They developed their scale on the basis of 
Jen’s famous Intragroup Conflict Scale, who developed a measurement for the two discussed 
dimensions of conflict (Jehn, 1995). Pearson et al.’s scale for relationship conflict consists of 
three items, which we took over: For one relationship conflict item “How much tension was 
there in the group during decision?” we replaced “during decisions” with “during the exercise” 
as our focus was on the whole one hour group interaction and not merely on the moments peo-
ple took decisions. For the task conflict item “How many disagreements regarding different 
ideas were there?” we added “during the one hour discussion”. For both task conflict and rela-
tionship conflict, the responses were recorded on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 
(=”none”) to 4 (=”a great deal”). In order to model the curvilinear relationship (inverted u-
shape) for task conflict, we introduced a quadratic component to the linear function (x2) 
(Backhaus et al., 2003). 
Decision Commitment 
We measured the level of ‘decision commitment’ with a 3-item scale we have devel-
oped ourselves: 1. I feel confident that our group made the right decisions; 2. The group was 
better at making the decision than I could have done by myself; 3. The decisions were unani-
mous 4. There was a lot of agreement in the group. As a response scale, we have used the 5-
point Likert scale ranging from (0=”strongly agree”) to 4 (=”strongly disagree”).  
Mode of Analysis 
The model we have presented for knowledge integration is an indirect reflective, sec-
ond order model with multiple mediating constructs. In view of the type of model, but consid-
ering our limited sample size, we will do a combination of structural equation modelling 
(SEM) technique and traditional confirmatory factor analysis. SEM allows for the simultane-
ous analysis of all relationships in a model (and not merely the linkage between two constructs 
at a time), and, more importantly for this study, for the analysis of models that include second 
order latent variables. Yet, an important drawback of SEM is the need for a large minimal 
sample size. While traditional regression analysis requires a minimum of only 30 cases to ob-
tain robust results, in SEM, accepted minimal samples size range from 50 (if we operate with 
loading factors of more than 0.75) (Hair et al., 1998) to the more accepted 100 to 150 cases 
(Gefen, 2000). In view of models with second order latent variables, authors even mention 200 
as an accepted minimal (MacCallum et al., 1996). Other scholars define minimal sample size 
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in terms ratio of observations to parameters to be estimated (Jackson, 2003) and fix the ratio at 
10:1 or even 20:1 (Kline, 1998). Barclay and his colleagues state, for example, that the sample 
should have at least ten times more data-points than the number of items in the most complex 
construct in the model (Barclay et al., 1995).  
In view of our small sample size of 64 respondents (32 for each condition), we can ob-
tain relatively robust results only when performing traditional regression analysis. Yet, since 
this type of analysis is not possible for the model we have proposed, we have opted for a com-
bined approach (Hair et al., 1998; MacCallum et al., 1996; MacCallum et al., 1999). We first 
conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (with the support of the software package SPSS) for 
the first order latent constructs, then introduced those constructs – in the form of indicators - in 
the AMOS program and treated them as observed variables. Even if approaching the analysis 
this way, the problem of minimal sample size is not fully resolved so that this analysis can 
only be seen as a first inconclusive analysis that helps us to refine the model and our hypothe-
ses for further studies that allow for an analysis with more statistical power.  
Structural equation modelling (SEM) was used to examine the construct of knowledge 
integration and its hypothesised dimensional indicators: equal participation, big picture, com-
mon ground, constructive conflict (low level of task conflict, lack of relationship conflict). In 
addition, it aims to understand the moderation effect of the use of content-specific, interactive 
visualization support on the model of knowledge integration. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
In this section, we will present the results of the descriptive and factorial analysis. 
Since our hypotheses are on a structural level, we will not discuss distributions, frequencies, or 
central tendency in detail. Instead, we limit ourselves to address briefly issues concerning the 
normality of distribution, the results of the confirmatory factor analysis, the mean and standard 
deviation of the latent variables and the discussion of the qualitative questions of the question-
naire.  
In total, 64 people participated at the experiment, that is 32 respondents for both the 
tool and non tool condition and a total of 16 groups (each of which consists of four people). 
The unit of analysis was set at the individual level. 23 of the participants were men, 41 were 
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female. We have 4 missing data, but in view of our already small sample size, we decided not 
to proceed with a listwise, but with a casewise exclusion of the cases that showed missing val-
ues. The discussion of the normality of the distribution can be found in Appendix 6. 
Table 1 shows the results of the confirmatory factor analysis that is the psychonometric 
properties of the adjusted scales assessed in terms of the item loadings, the eigenvalues, the 
percentages of explained variance, and the Cronbach alphas. For the factor loadings, we used a 
cut-off criteria of 0.60 and for the Cronbach alphas of 0.70 (Devellis, 1991). The original 
scales with their psychonometric properties can be seen in Appendix 7.  
Factor Item Factor Loading  
% of vari-
ance ex-
plained 
Cronbach 
alpha 
Mean 
(S.D.) 
Equal Participa-
tion (EP) 
1. There were not one or two people who 
dominated the discussion .891 
 2. There was an adequate participation from 
all members of the group. .891 
0.79 0.74 1.04 (0.85) 
Big Picture (BP) 1. The conversation process was very clear .806 
 2. We never lost time on discussing     
 irrelevant issues .724 
 3. We never lost time on too detailed  
 discussions .602 
 4. I always knew how a specific contribution 
 related to the more general topic of the  
 discussion. 
.603 
 5. At every point in time I knew why the  
 group was discussing a specific issue. .774 
 6. I knew at every point in time where we  
 where in the discussion .632 
0.48 0.78 1.23 (0.57) 
Common Ground 
(CG) 
1. During the discussion the group created a 
shared and deep understanding of the 
topic. 
.879 
 2. During the conversation, the group devel-
oped and shared a common language to 
deal with the task 
.879 
0.77 0.70 0.95 (0.56) 
Task Conflict (TC) 1. How many disagreements regarding 
different ideas were there during the one 
hour discussion? 
.838 
 2. How many differences about the content 
of decisions did the group have to work 
through? 
.749 
 3. How many differences of opinion were 
there within the group? .837 
0.65 0.73 2.60 (0.56) 
Relationship 
Conflict (RC) 
1. How much anger was there among the 
members of the group? .854 
 2. How much tension was there in the group 
during the exercise? .898 
 3. How much personal friction was there in 
the group during decisions? .901 
0.78 0.85 3.60 (0.65) 
Decision Com-
mitment (DC) 
1. I feel confident that our group made the 
right decisions - - - 
0.92 
(0.63) 
Table 1: Factor Loadings, Percentages of Variance Explained, Cronbach Alphas, Mean Values, and 
Standard Deviations  of First Order Latent Variables 
Notes regarding the mean values: All constructs are measured with five-point Likert scales with the 
anchors 0 = strongly agree, 2 = neither/nor, 4 = strongly disagree, except for Task Conflict and Rela-
tionship Conflict that have five-point scales ranging from 0 = none, 4 = a very great deal 
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We were able to maintain the original scales for most of the constructs, but had to 
adapt them for ‘equal participation’ and ‘decision commitment’. With regard to ‘equal partici-
pation’, we had to drop the item that checked for the equality in participation not with regard 
to the speakers and their turns made, but with regard to the listeners and their active considera-
tion of what is said (The other members of my group paid attention to the comments I made.). 
Concerning the ‘decision commitment’ construct showed Cronbach alphas below 0.70 
for the original 4-item scale, as well as for the various 3- and 2-item scale versions. Even 
though we have significant correlations for example between questions 1, 2, 4 (I feel confident 
that our group made the right decisions; The group was better at making the decision than I 
could have done by myself; There was a lot of agreement in the group) and factor loading of 
above 0.70, we have insufficient Cronbach alphas. Apparently, the items, even if correlated do 
not measure the same characteristic of the decision commitment construct. Question 2 points 
more versus group performance, and agreeing is not the same as committing. Von Krogh et al. 
(2000: 134) for example made the argument that agreeing does not equal understanding. 
Rather, agreeing is a commodity, which does not require understanding. Similarly, we could 
say that an agreement without a full understanding does not necessary lead to more commit-
ment. Out of this factorial analysis, we had to decide to work only with one item and have 
chosen the most straightforward one: I feel confident that our group made the right decisions. 
Overall, the choice to work with a pre-established scale for decision commitment, as for ex-
ample the one proposed by Earley and Lind (1987), would have been preferable. The fact that 
we can use only one indicator for the decision commitment construct confronts us with an im-
portant weakness of the evaluation of the proposed model for knowledge integration.  
From the mean values and standard deviations we can see that, as is true for the singu-
lar items, also most latent variables are positively skewed (see: Appendix 6). Mean values 
show that respondents reported participation to be generally equal, that they managed to gain a 
pretty good big picture, created common ground, that task conflict was low, relationship con-
flict almost non-existent, that they were pretty satisfied with their performance as a group, and, 
finally, that they felt quite committed to the decisions taken. The results of the mean compari-
son between the two conditions (tool vs. non-tool) can be seen in Appendix 8.  
For a better understanding of the use and perception of the tool, we added some quanti-
tative and qualitative control questions to the questionnaire, which can provide first indica-
tions. When asked to describe the two major advantages of working with the tool. People re-
sponded most frequently that the tool allows for gaining an overall idea, for keeping in mind 
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the global outlook, and for visualizing schematically the major issues of the topic and thus 
providing a useful summary (see: Table 2).  
ADVANTAGES  DISADVANTAGES / DIFFICULTIES  
 No.  No.
General Impression 
• practical/useful/effective  
• simple & easy to use 
• immediate, quick 
• open, generic, flexible 
• colored 
• innovative 
 
Provides big picture (overview and pre-
cision  
in detail) 
• allows for gaining overall idea/global out-
look/summary (schematic visualization of 
major points) 
• helps to stay in the discussion “great for 
knowing what we are talking about and 
where we are going” 
• helps not to loose track of the objectives of 
the discussion 
• allows for major precision 
 
Provides structure 
• turns issues explicit and clear 
• provides clear categories and structures 
 
Provides flexible persistence 
• gives possibility to cancel, change and update 
with the unfolding of the conversation 
• documents the findings and decisions taken 
• helps to remember precedent decision 
• simplifies the reaching of conclusions 
 
Provides common ground 
• provides common ground "everybody has got 
the same in front of the eyes" 
• offers common discussion structure 
• unifies 
• facilitates sharing of information 
 
Fosters reflection and changes in per-
spective 
• activates reflection 
• fosters alternative perspective in thinking 
 
Supports the simultaneous juggling of 
large amounts of information items 
• allows for having at disposition all the infor-
mation 
 
Fosters commitment 
• allows for major concentration and commit-
ment of all group members 
19
18
4 
4 
2 
2 
 
 
 
20
 
 
7
 
1 
1
12
3 
 
 
 
3 
 
3 
 
1 
1 
2 
 
3 
 
1 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
2
Hampered conversation process 
• loosing time (because of formulation 
problems, handwriting is more immedi-
ate), interruptions in conversation flow 
• low correspondence between what is said in 
discussion and what then has to be filled in 
on tool (use the tool after the discussion) 
• breaks in conversation 
• person who handles mouse is out of dis-
cussion and distracted (unequal participa-
tion) 
 
Difficulty to adapt to predefined catego-
ries, modes of thinking, and format 
• being forced to reason in the provided 
limited categories and metaphors - lack-
ing flexibility 
• packed templates do not provide enough 
space 
 
Excessive focus on technology 
• handling problems due to low acquaintance 
with software 
• focus on the tool instead of looking at the 
group members 
• too much concentration on the tool instead of 
on the task (focus on the how (how to ap-
proach issue) rather than the what) 
 
Forced consensual representation 
• being forced to write also the aspects on 
which the group has not found a consensus 
10
1
1
 
5
 
 
5
3
 
2
3
3
 
 
1
Table 2:  Results of the Two Open-Ended Qualitative Questions: ”What are the two major advan-
tages/disadvantages of the use of the visual tool during the exercise?” 
Note: No. indicates for the numbers of times a specific answer was given 
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In contrast to these positive quotes, 33% of the respondents felt that the tool was an ob-
stacle for the flow of the conversation and almost 30% said that it hindered an equal participa-
tion at the conversation (cumulative percentage of respondents who answered with “strongly 
agree” or “agree”). People reported that the handling of the tool made them loose time (formu-
lation problems) and interrupted the flow of the conversation (see: Table 2). In addition, the 
person handling the tool became either very dominant in the conversation or acted as being 
relegated to the silent secretary that takes minutes. Spending time on detailed discussions how 
to word an issue certainly is problematic for maintaining the big picture. One reason for this 
sensation of loosing time with the handling of the tool can stem from the interlocutors’ relative 
unfamiliarity with the tool. As discussed earlier (see: Pretest), we tried to assure a sufficient 
familiarity with the tool in various ways. First, the tool is quite easy to use and resembles in its 
mode of operation very common software programs (i.e. drag and drop). Second, students had 
to do an individual exercise with the tool prior to the experiment for a first familiarization. 
Third, the members of each group could decide themselves who should be appointed with the 
role of handling the tool during the discussion. It is therefore most likely that they have chosen 
a person who is quite adroit in handling software instruments. In spite of all these facts, stu-
dents might have known the functionalities of the tool, but nevertheless not have felt very fa-
miliar in using the tool. In fact, observing the adoptions and appropriations of the tool 
(DeSanctis & Poole, 1994) were quite insightful. Most groups used only a very limited range 
of the functionalities the tool offers. Many, for example, did not work with colours for cluster-
ing, they did not use the comments for adding more detailed information and did not add new 
textboxes. In addition, groups differed quite significantly in the way they used the tool. Some 
drew on it while conversing as an ongoing visualization of what was discussed; others used the 
tool only every five minutes as a summary device. In this latter case, it is clear that using the 
tool interrupts the conversation flow. Similarly, some groups gave the tool-handler more 
autonomy and let him/her document the conversation rather quickly, others decided in rather 
long collective processes what to write and how to formulate each single statement. While 
each form of adoption has its advantages (e.g. collective formulation might turn tacit misun-
derstandings or task conflicts more apparent), it is most likely that the groups had not found 
out yet how to best make use of the tool. Familiarity with the tool might therefore be an im-
portant issue when stating that the tool hampered the conversation process. In spite of these 
reservations, only 9% of the respondents stated that they would have preferred to complete the 
task without the tool and only 11% reported that the tool added complexity to the task. Simi-
larly, some people felt uncomfortable to reason in the provided categories, metaphors and per-
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ceived those as an inflexible additional structure to the task. The perception of additional com-
plexity is correlated to the impression that the tool hampered an equal participation (.71*). 
Secondly, individuals who reported that they were used to solve case studies, tended to state 
also that they would have preferred to work without the tool (correlation of .64*). It seems that 
if individuals were familiar with the kind of task, they did not need the structure the tool pro-
vides and perceived it therefore as less useful. 
Finally, we controlled for satisfaction with performance using 3 items of Murthy and 
Kerr’s (2003) four item scale (one item was specific to their research context). Satisfaction 
with performance measures the positive feelings and attitudes members of a group have to-
ward a decision taken or a performance reached by the group (Keyton, 1999). Satisfaction is 
an important control variable out of various considerations. Previous research could show that 
the sharing of information leads to a greater group member satisfaction (U-shaped relation-
ship: Mennecke, 1997), that there is also a positive relationship between members’ participa-
tion and satisfaction (Fisher & Ellis, 1990; Olaniran, 1996), but that both content and relation-
ship conflict lead to less satisfaction (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003). Knowledge integration, as 
we have conceptualized it, involves equal participation, the exchange of information, but also 
the examination of this information with a constructive level of conflict. For this reason, it is 
particularly interesting to measure this outcome variable as a control measure5. We found, 
comparing the tool with the non-tool condition, that there is no significant mean difference 
between the two conditions. Pearson correlations show that the satisfaction with the group 
performance positively correlates with the creation of the big picture (.70**) and with the 
creation of common ground (.52*) and negatively with relationship conflict (-.40*). The crea-
tion and perpetuation of the big picture in a conversation seems thus to be an important aspect 
for the satisfaction with group performance and has to be further researched in future studies. 
With regard to equal participation and content conflict, we were not able to confirm findings 
of previous studies as we did not find significant correlations between these constructs and the 
satisfaction with the group performance. 
In summary, from the first descriptive and factorial analysis, we have gained the fol-
lowing insights. The descriptive analysis has shown that we have slightly abnormal distribu-
tions both on the level of the items as for the latent variables. Conducting the factorial analy-
                                                 
5 Other outcome variables like decision quality are more problematic to a study, which works with a pref-
erence task and which views communication not simply as a medium for decision making or knowledge integra-
tion, but as the constitutive element of these processes (Poole & Hirokawa, 1996). 
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sis, we were able to confirm many of the original scales we used in the questionnaire. Only for 
the constructs of equal participation and decision commitment, we had to adjust the originally 
proposed scales. Finally, the discussion of the qualitative questions has shown that conversa-
tion partners using the visual tool perceived it as helpful and easy to use and that it allowed 
them to more easily gain a global overview on the topic, as well as making issues explicit. 
Problematic was though that the tool forced them to spend a lot of time on formulating and 
documenting and stopped the natural conversation flow. Such drawbacks are most likely to be 
lessened once the conversation partners are more familiar with the tool. 
In the following, we will present our structural analysis of the knowledge integration 
model and later discuss the moderation effect of the software based visualization tool. 
Structuration Analysis: Testing the Knowledge Integration Model 
The structural analysis is geared towards the evaluation of the following two claims. 
First, we aim to evaluate the proposed model for knowledge integration (hypotheses H1-H5) 
and, second, we want to test the hypothesis whether the interactive visualization tool has a 
moderation effect on the relationships of the model for knowledge integration (Hm1-Hm4).  
Before presenting the results of the structure equation modelling analysis, Table 3 pre-
sents the inter-construct correlations of the latent variables.  
 EP BP CG TC RC DC 
Equal Participation (EP)       
Big Picture (BP) .36**      
Common Ground (CG) .31* .34**     
Task Conflict (TC) -.33** -.20 .07    
Relationship Conflict (RC) -.19 -.31* -.22 .26*   
Decision Commitment (DC) .21 .38** .04 -.38** -.15  
Table 3:  Pearson’s Inter-Construct Correlations 
** Significance at .01 level, * Significance at .05 level 
Various correlations are insignificant and the significant ones show low correlations (0.2 < r ≤ 
0.5). In view of our proposed second order reflective model, low correlations among the re-
flective constructs are expected (Edwards, 2001; Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000). 
Figure 10 shows the results of the structure equation analysis we have conducted with 
the help of the software package Amos 6.  
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Overall, the general model of fit measures are positive. We have satisfactory results for 
AIC (37.601) and CAIC (78.666), as well as for BCC (40.851) and BIC (65.666), as their 
numbers are lower for the default model than for the saturated model. These information theo-
retical measures are most important to confirm our model for knowledge integration, given the 
non-randomized selection of the sample. With regard to the descriptive measures, the GFI 
(0.951) is higher than 0.95, and AGFI (0.871) misses for a few points the 0.9 threshold. Fur-
thermore, the chi-square (11.601) in relation to the degree of freedom (8) indicates a good 
model of fit, even a slight overfit. Finally, the measures of approximate fit, pclose (0.263, 
should be above 0.5) and RMSEA (0.263, should be smaller than 0.05) are not satisfactory.  
The small degree of freedom shows the limited power of this first test of the model. 
MacCallum and colleagues, for example, argued, that when the degree of freedom is small, the 
confidence intervals will be very wide and the test will be subject to considerable imprecision 
unless N (the sample size) is extremely large. According to these authors, with a degree of 
freedom of 8, a sample size of 954 is needed in order test for close fit and achieve a power of 
0.80 (MacCallum et al., 1996). In view of the very limited power of this first empirical test, 
the most important measures of model fit indicate to tentatively confirm the model, while 
other important ones (such as pclose and RMSEA) remind us to remain cautious. 
Before discussing the model in more detail, one comment on a measurement level is 
necessary. We needed to introduce one residual correlation (of 0.46) between common 
Figure 10: Results of the Structural Equation Analysis for the 
Knowledge Integration Model 
Knowledge
Integration 
in Decision 
Making
Task
Conflict
Common 
Ground
Big Picture
Balanced
Participation
Decision 
Commitment
.25
.50
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-.57
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.42
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Standardized Estimates:
chi-square= 11.60 df=8 p-value=.170
gfi=.951 agfi=.871 aic=37.601
rmsea=.085 pclose=.263
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ground and task conflict in order to obtain the reported results. Apparently, people perceive a 
positive connection between task conflict and common ground. As we have mentioned earlier, 
task conflict can, under specific circumstances, lead to a more in-depth and richer understand-
ing of the issue (Eisenhardt et al., 2000). While arguing on a content level, interlocutors de-
velop a richer common ground among them. This conceptual connection explains why we can 
have residual correlations between the two constructs. 
Figure 10 shows that the latent variables reflecting knowledge integration are all – 
with the exception of task conflict - going in the direction we have claimed: equal participa-
tion, big picture, and common ground reflect knowledge integration positively, while relation-
ship conflict reflects it negatively. Again with the exception of task conflict, we have satisfac-
tory coefficients for the loadings (above 0.5) and the variances explained (above 0.3) for all 
the latent variables. Most important for knowledge integration and most positively related is 
the big picture construct (with a loading coefficient (L) of 0.68 and an explained variance 
(EV) of 0.46) (H2 supported). Equal participation (L= 0.64, EV= 0.42) is similarly important 
(H1 supported), followed by common ground (L= 0.56, EV= 0.31) (H3 supported). This 
means that if conversation partners manage to create and maintain a big picture over the deci-
sion that has to be taken, i.e. they know how single aspects and contributions relate to the 
more general issue and do not get lost in discussions on details or irrelevant side-issues, then 
one can be pretty confident that they manage to integrate their knowledge. Yet, also common 
ground and equal participation are important reflections of the whether knowledge integration 
has taken place. On the other hand, as expected, relationship conflict reflects knowledge inte-
gration negatively (L= -0.57, EV= 0.33). Regarding the second phase of knowledge integra-
tion – the integration of the group knowledge into the decision making process – we equally 
have satisfactory results with a coefficient of 0.50. Yet, the explained variance of 0.25 is fairly 
low. A successful first-phase integration of individual knowledge into group knowledge ex-
plains only a fourth of why people feel committed to a decision (H5 weakly supported). 
The results for task conflict did not meet our previsions entirely. We have made the 
hypothesis of an inverted U-curve relationship between task conflict and knowledge integra-
tion and have claimed that a moderate level of task conflict positively reflects knowledge inte-
gration. As mentioned earlier, we have operationalized this curvilinear relationship by squar-
ing the task conflict concept (Backhaus et al., 2003). Yet, even when modelling such a curvi-
linear relationship, we find a negative coefficient of -0.39 (which is, as expected lower than 
for relationship conflict). In addition, task conflict explains only 15% of the variance of 
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knowledge integration. Testing for the alternatively possible linear relationship, we find a -
0.45 loading coefficient with an explained variance of 0.20. We interpret these findings that 
even a low or moderate level of task conflict reflects knowledge integration negatively and 
that a negative linear relationship is more likely (together with positive results for relationship 
conflict, H4 is supported). This finding stands in line with the recent quantitative meta-
analysis on the literature on task conflict of De Dreu und Weingart (2003). In contrast to the 
general view of the positive effects of a moderate level of task conflict and the negative ones 
of relationship conflict, De Dreu and Weingart showed that task conflict actually has strong, 
negative effects on team effectiveness. They found this result to be true even if the correlation 
between task and relationship conflict was low. They concluded, conflict should not to be con-
sidered inherently as non-functional, rather, future research should study the circumstances, in 
which conflict can have positive consequences (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003). It will therefore 
be particularly interesting to see whether the use of the tool creates a circumstance, in which 
the relationship of task conflict and knowledge integration is less negative or even positive.  
Testing the Moderation Effect of the Interactive Visualization Tool 
The general aim of this second structure equation analysis is to show that, introducing 
a group comparison, we obtain a better model fit for knowledge integration and that we have a 
significant moderation effect on a relationship level of the model. In other words, we will 
show that conversation partners, interacting with the support of a visual tool, rely in their at-
tempts to integrate knowledge more on the establishment of the big picture and the common 
ground, and less so on conflict.  
First, introducing a group comparison in the structure equation analysis (tool versus 
non-tool), we actually find better overall model of fit measures. The information theoretical 
measures, (AIC 68.176) and BCC (83.343) are lower for the default model than for the satu-
rated model. The descriptive measures, GFI (0.923) is over the 0.9 margin, not so, for a few 
points, AGFI (0.798). The chi-square amounts to 16.176, which results in a slight overfit in 
relation to the degree of freedom of 16. The important measures of approximate fit, pclose (of 
0.600, should be and is above 0.5) and RMSEA (of 0.013, should be and is smaller than 0.05), 
show also satisfactory results. We find that, controlling for the tool use, we have better overall 
model fit measures and that there are actually structural differences how people integrate their 
knowledge when conversing in the unsupported or visually supported condition.  
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Second, we find a significant moderating effect of the use of the interactive visual tool 
on our model for knowledge integration (with a p of 0.010). Figure 11 and Figure 12 show the 
single coefficients and explained variances for the knowledge integration model, both for the 
tool and non-tool condition. Comparing the loading coefficients and the explained variances 
among the two situations, we can see that people, in the tool condition, rely mostly on the 
creation of a big picture and a common ground to integrate their knowledge and much less on 
equal participation and conflict. In the non-supported situation, the image is reversed: inter-
locutors account to a great extent on equal participation and conflict to integrate their knowl-
edge and less so on the creation and perpetuation of a big picture and a common ground. Since 
conflict is reflecting knowledge integration negatively, we can say that in the non supported 
condition, interlocutors have more difficulties in integrating their knowledge. To visualize this 
overall finding of a parallel reversed image between the two conditions, we have drawn the 
sizes of the circles around the constructs corresponding to their importance for knowledge 
integration (see: Figure 11 and Figure 12). 
In more detail, we can observe the moderation effect of the tool most dramatically in 
the changes between common ground and task conflict. In the tool supported situation, com-
mon ground loads with a coefficient of 0.75 and explains 57% of the variance of knowledge 
integration. Task conflict, on its part, plays absolutely no role for knowledge integration. Its 
loading is still negative, but very low (-0.16) and it does not account for any variance in 
knowledge integration (0.02). On the other hand, in the non-supported condition, the situation 
Figure 11: Knowledge Integration for Groups Interact-
ing with the Support of the Visual Tool 
Figure 12: Knowledge Integration for Groups Inter-
acting without a Visual Support 
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is exactly the opposite. Here, common ground does not explain knowledge integration in any 
way (low loading of 0.27 and very low explained variance 0.07), yet the impact of task con-
flict is strongly negative (loading of -0.66) and the explained variance is considerable (0.43). 
From these findings, we can infer that when lacking common ground, people start arguing 
about the issue when they attempt to integrate their knowledge. The tool facilitates the estab-
lishment of a common ground between the participants of a conversation, which makes task 
conflict become less important for the interlocutors’ endeavours in integrating their knowl-
edge.  
Another interesting finding regarding the reversed picture and the relationship between 
common ground and task conflict is that respondents perceive a conceptual proximity between 
the two constructs only if they are supported by the tool. While in the general model, we have 
found correlations between the residuals between common ground and task conflict, the group 
comparison shows that, in the non-tool condition, the correlation is of only 0.14, whereas in 
the tool condition, the correlation is 0.61 high. We have argued that people perceive these two 
constructs to be interrelated in the sense that task conflict can - under specific circumstances - 
lead to a deeper understanding of the issue and to a greater common ground. For the interlocu-
tors interacting without the visual tool, the condition is not given for that they conceptually 
interlink task conflict to common ground. This gives us a first indication on the hypothesis that 
the tool use supports a constructive handling of conflict. 
We have claimed that constructive conflict is defined by three conditions: 1. a moder-
ate task conflict; 2. a low relationship conflict; 3. a low correlation between task and relation-
ship conflict. Comparing the model for knowledge integration between the two groups, we can 
find that, next to the already discussed differences concerning task conflict, relationship con-
flict loads strongly negatively on knowledge integration in both cases. In the tool supported 
situation, the loading coefficients and the explained variances are to some extent lower, but we 
can say that the use tool limits, but does not eliminate relationship conflict to be a negative 
cause of knowledge integration. What about the correlation between task conflict and relation-
ship conflict? Conducting a correlation analysis in SPSS comparing between the two groups, 
we find, in the non-supported condition, that task conflict and relationship conflict are signifi-
cantly positively correlated by a coefficient of 0.50**. On the other hand, if interlocutors are 
supported by the visual tool, there is no significant correlation between the two constructs 
(Pearson’s correlation coefficient: 0.05 n.s.). This means that, for the interlocutors interacting 
without the support of the visual tool, whenever they perceive a task conflict, they also per-
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ceive a relationship conflict. The interpretation is likely that, without a visual support, when-
ever conversation partners perceive content conflict, they understand it on a relational level, 
feel attacked personally and react on a personal level. Alternatively, it could also be that, in the 
non supported condition, interlocutors instrumentally use task conflict to fight out relational 
tensions among them. In both cases, a constructive handling of conflict is not possible. In sum, 
we can say that the use of the visual tool permits conversation partners to deal more construc-
tively with conflict: first of all, it cancels out the commingling of task conflict and relationship 
conflict. Secondly, the weight and negative impact of relationship conflict can be lowered. 
Finally, we have found that also a moderate task conflict does not reflect knowledge integra-
tion positively. Yet, we have seen that, in the tool condition, task conflict does not play an 
important role for knowledge integration. Its role is positively substituted by the successful 
establishment of a common ground and, as we will see in the following, by the creation and 
perpetuation of the big picture.  
For conversation partners interacting with the support of the tool, creating and sustain-
ing the big picture is much more central for knowledge integration than for those interacting in 
the natural condition. In fact, in the tool condition, the big picture construct loads with a coef-
ficient of 0.73 on knowledge integration and explains 53% of its variance. In the non-tool con-
dition, it loads with a lower coefficient of 0.56 and explains the variance only by 32%. This 
confirms our hypothesis that the tool facilitates the perpetuation of the big picture since the 
tool helps conversation partners to better tackle the difficult balance between detail and gen-
eral overview: it provides a dynamic visual summary so that interlocutors can position the 
main arguments, findings, questions that are emerging in the conversation, but can also deposit 
more detailed considerations thanks to the comment function.  
With regard to balanced participation, we see an opposite trend. While in the tool con-
dition, equal participation loads with .51 and explains 26% of the variance of knowledge inte-
gration, in the non-supported condition, it loads with a high coefficient of .70 and accounts for 
51% of the variance of knowledge integration. As we have stipulated, equal participation re-
mains important in both conditions. Yet, if conversation partners are not supported by an in-
teractive visual tool, they are more sensitive to interactional justice (Bies & Moag, 1986) and 
attribute more importance to equal participation for the integration of knowledge. On the other 
hand, if they are supported by an interactive visual, it is easier for them to see which aspects 
receive less attention and still need to be discussed, which areas have to be developed further 
and for which aspects they have already found a sufficient agreement. They might be focused 
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more on what is said rather than on who says what. For this reason, the equal participation of 
all interaction partners becomes less central in the tool condition. 
We have argued that knowledge integration is a two phase process, in which, first, the 
specialized knowledge of the individuals has to be integrated into a group knowledge, and then 
secondly, knowledge has to be integrated and transformed to the decisions to be taken. First, 
conversation partners share their insights and their specific perspectives on an issue and de-
velop a more complete understanding of it. Once they have developed such an understanding, 
they have to integrate and apply it in the decisions and actions to be taken. We have said that 
we measure this second phase of the integration process with the construct of decision com-
mitment. We have claimed that if the participants of a conversation are successful in the first 
phase of the integration process, this would lead to a better integration in the second phase and 
thus to a better commitment to the decision taken. We were able to show above that in the tool 
condition, conversation partners were more effective in integrating their individual knowledge 
into a group knowledge, which is why we also expected a better integration into decision mak-
ing in the second phase, i.e. a stronger correlation with decision commitment. Yet, the num-
bers show that the correlation is more or less the same for the two situations. For the tool con-
dition, we have a loading coefficient of 0.53 and an explained variance of 0.28. Similarly, in 
the unsupported condition we have slightly lower L (0.50) and EV (0.25). Working with the 
tool in the decision making process does not make people feel more committed to the deci-
sions taken. We can conclude that the work with the visual tool supports the first phase in the 
knowledge integration process (the integration of specialized individual knowledge into group 
knowledge) as it facilitates big picture and common ground, but it seems not to facilitate the 
application of this knowledge into decisions and actions.  
Implications, Conclusions & Limitations 
In this final section, we review the central contributions and limitations of this paper. 
Understanding knowledge integration as a communication process, we have understood its 
challenges to be equally communicative and have defined – on the basis of existing literature 
and three explorative case studies – a communicative model for knowledge integration. Con-
sequently, we have argued that the modality of communication changes the importance of the 
constitutive elements – equal participation, big picture, common ground, constructive conflict 
- of the model. In particular, we have claimed that interactive visualization can facilitate the 
communication across knowledge boundaries as communicators rely in their integration ef-
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forts more on the facilitated construction of common ground and big picture, manage to deal 
with conflict more constructively, and are less sensitive to interactional justice (Bies & Moag, 
1986) such as equal participation. 
The aim of the empirical part of this article has been twofold: 1. provide a first empiri-
cal support for the model of knowledge integration in decision making, and 2. test whether the 
mode of communication moderates the way people integrate knowledge, more specifically, 
test whether supporting conversations by interactive visual tools motivates conversers to adapt 
a different strategy to integrate knowledge and rely less on equal participation and conflict, but 
on the establishment of common ground and big picture.  
With regard to the first point, we found support for the presented reflective model for 
knowledge integration. In particular, we could confirm hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H5, and par-
tially confirm H4. Only with regard to constructive conflict, our hypothesis (H4) could not be 
confirmed entirely. We found that while relationship conflict does reflect knowledge integra-
tion negatively, a moderate task conflict does not reflect knowledge integration positively 
(confutation of inverted u-curve hypothesis). This is an interesting finding also for the estab-
lished discourse on conflict in decision making as it contradicts the long held belief that con-
tent conflict can have a positive effect on decision making (result, which finds support by the 
meta-study of De Dreu & Weingart, 2003). One minor limitation of the model is, in addition, 
that although the results for decision commitment are positive (H5), the first phase of integra-
tion (when the specialized individual knowledge is integrated to a group knowledge) explains 
only 25% of the variance in decision commitment. Although the aim of this study was not to 
provide an exhaustive explanation for decision commitment, we have to acknowledge that the 
integration of individual knowledge into group knowledge accounts for relatively little and 
that our support for the second phase of knowledge integration (integration of group knowl-
edge into actual decision making) is not very strong. 
With regard to the use of interactive visuals to support face-to-face conversations, we 
have found that the modality of the communication has an impact on the presented model for 
knowledge integration on a structural level and we could confirm all four moderation hypothe-
ses Hm1 - Hm4. If the conversers lack the common ground among them and the big picture of 
the issue, then they are more sensitive to equal participation in their knowledge integration 
efforts and rely more on conflict. Yet, they are not able to constructively deal with conflict, 
which is why their attempts to integrate knowledge are less successful. In fact, we could show 
that in the situation where people interact without a visual support, not only both task conflict 
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and relationship conflict strongly negatively reflect knowledge integration, also do task con-
flict and relationship conflict significantly correlate with each other and conflict cannot be 
handled in a constructive manner. Supporting conversers through an interactive tool helps 
them to gain the big picture on an issue, establish a common ground and to more construc-
tively deal with conflict. Next to these positive accounts of the use of cooperative visual tools, 
we have equally discussed some drawbacks: It can interrupt the flow of the conversation when 
the moderator needs to document what has been discussed and the group waits for him to have 
finished. This aspect depends on the skills of the moderator and his familiarity with the tool. 
The work with the tool can also add complexity to the task by imposing an additional analytic 
frame, which further might be lived by conversation partners as limitative and adding a rigid 
frame of thinking. There might be additional problems related to the use of the visual tool for 
the integration of knowledge, which are not so easily observable by conversation partners. 
Visualization leads to a reification of abstract concepts in perceivable objects. This might fa-
cilitate, on the one hand, understanding, on the other, it can aggravate the tendency of people 
to cling to an inappropriate mode of approaching an issue (Eppler, 2003) and impede perspec-
tives changes.  
Overall, the results from the group comparison suggest that there are important de-
pendencies among the various constituting elements of knowledge integration, which we up-
front conceived as independent. When presenting the model for knowledge integration, we 
have identified four major communicative challenges present when experts interact with deci-
sion makers and aim to integrate knowledge in the decision process. Yet, we have not dis-
cussed eventual correlations amongst the various challenges. On the basis of the present litera-
ture and the insights we gained from the explorative case studies, we believe that it is already a 
step to isolate some key knowledge integration challenges and gain an understanding of their 
importance for the phenomenon. The numbers of the group comparison (visualization sup-
port/natural condition) then has shown an exactly reversed picture in the two conditions and 
has led us interpret the data in a direction where dependencies among the major four knowl-
edge integration challenges are assumed: At the absence of a sufficient common ground and at 
the lack of a big picture of the issue, conversation partners compensate with conflict and be-
come highly sensitive to equal turn taking. These interpretations are somewhat daring as we 
have just observed a decline/increase of certain constituting elements of knowledge integra-
tion, but have not actually tested for their dependence. Future research should therefore be 
more explicit about the interrelationships among the elements, which constitute the knowledge 
integration process. Our interpreted interrelationships are also still somewhat unspecific and 
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future research should analyze more precisely whether it needs the creation of both big picture 
and common ground conjointly for that conflict becomes less important in the knowledge in-
tegration process or whether one of them is sufficient.  
A second limitation of the presented model for knowledge integration in decision mak-
ing is generally true for models and is that it is not comprehensive and misses out variables 
that are might be crucial for the explanation of the phenomenon. One such variable could be 
the degree of novelty and variability inherent within the decision to take or task to confront. 
Scarbrough et al. for example state that the higher the novelty or uniqueness of a project task, 
the higher is the potential but also challenge for knowledge integration (Scarbrough et al., 
2004). Similarly, Carlile refers to the knowledge’s nature of being path-dependent, which 
makes it particularly difficult for interlocutors to give up their knowledge and accept or de-
velop new knowledge: “The most challenging aspect of the relational nature of knowledge at a 
boundary is that for each actor there is novelty to share with others and novelty to assess from 
others” (Carlile, 2004: 557). Next to this aspect of novelty, there are other aspects that we have 
not taken into account. These might not be directly related to the communicative situation of 
experts and decision makers, but are present in the organizational context and have an influ-
ence on the interaction. Alavi and Tiwana for example discuss the inflexibility of organiza-
tional ties, which represents a challenge to knowledge integration efforts (Alavi & Tiwana, 
2002). Hargadon and Sutton (2000) mention the rate of employee turnover to be another chal-
lenge for knowledge integration and which in fact is an element that impacts on the challenge 
of establishing a common ground. In this way, there are various extensions possible for the 
model of knowledge integration we have presented. Yet, we have outlined that the model pre-
sented is a communicative model and aims to capture only the interactional, communicative 
challenges present at a knowledge boundary. In this way, its focus is more micro and it delib-
erately misses out larger organizational aspects already fairly well discussed in the organiza-
tional literature (De Boer et al., 1999; Dougherty, 1992; Eisenhardt & Santos, 2000; Grant, 
1996a; Huang & Newell, 2003; Ravasi & Verona, 2001; Scarbrough et al., 2004). We have 
argued that if we adopt a relational, contextual, practice-bound understanding of knowledge 
and if we agree that knowledge is created, shared, integrated, or applied in social interactions 
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995), it is important to study the communicative challenges present in 
the primary form of these interactions, which are conversations. In this way, the presented 
model on knowledge integration represents an attempt in this direction. It singles out major 
obstacles that are present in conversations and which inhibit the integration of knowledge 
across knowledge boundaries. Future research could aim to address more specifically the inter-
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relationships of such micro-communicative challenges with more macro-organizational as-
pects that challenge the integration of knowledge in decision making.  
Next to these limitations regarding our model, this study also has several limitations 
regarding its methodology. First and foremost, we have mentioned the small N of our data for 
conducting structure equation modelling analysis and we have discussed the limitations this 
poses to the external validity and robustness. Second, we have seen that the respondents were 
only semi-familiar with the visualization tool in spite of the pre-arrangements we have made 
(presenting students the use and functionality of tool, making them work with the tool for a 
course exercise prior to the experiment). Third, the hidden profile situation might lead to an 
information difference, but not to a true difference of knowledge within the group. The in-
depth knowledge of a knowledge management expert and the mode of thinking of a decision 
maker cannot be simulated fully in this way. Forth, the reliability of self-reporting (through 
questionnaires) on conversational processes is questionable in so far as conversation partners 
are not fully aware of their conversation behaviour and there might be important differences 
between their espoused theories (self-descriptions of one’s behaviour, values, beliefs) and the 
ones in use (more implicit values, beliefs, and assumptions manifested in practice) (Argyris & 
Schön, 1978). Finally, a general critique on the experimental design we have used is that we 
have worked with students as respondents for the experiment (Gordon et al., 1986). 
Future research can address these limitations in various ways. The experiment could be 
replicated by using – instead of students - two groups of professionals, between which a clear 
difference in specialization exists and can be assessed through knowledge tests and tests of 
thinking styles (Sternberg, 1997). Researchers could combine methods that rely on self-
reporting and those that permit observation of communicative behaviour directly. Question-
naires could be complemented by recorded conversation analysis. To address the important 
issue of tool familiarization, more embedded and longitudinal studies have to be conducted. 
Scholars would study in a mid-timeframe how collaborative visual tools are appropriated by 
certain organizational teams or departments. They would also have to examine whether a re-
curring use of the tool would lead participants of a conversation to change their way they deal 
with the identified challenges of knowledge integrating conversations, such as equal participa-
tion, common ground, big picture, or constructive conflict. In addition, institutional aspects 
such as are discussed in Orlikowski and Barley (2001) have to be considered and need to be 
further investigated in future research endeavours. 
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Finally, practitioners and decision support developers can gain the following insights 
from this study. First, we have seen that even simple tools need a certain time for appropria-
tion and familiarization. The benefits that a collaborative visualization tool can provide for a 
decision making meeting depend on the skills of the facilitator using it. If he/she is capable of 
summarizing a five minute conversation on a certain issue in one sentence and position it 
meaningfully in a visual template, the tool will not slow down the speed of the conversation, 
but help to structure it and help interlocutors in creating the big picture of an issue. Practitio-
ners, who want to introduce a new collaboration technology in their organization, are therefore 
well advised to introduce the technology together with a meeting facilitator, who is not only 
trained in the functionalities of the technology, but who is also knowledgeable about meeting 
facilitation and who has a knowledge on which visual templates are useful for which task type. 
We have further learned from the qualitative and control questions that using a visual tool can 
not only facilitate knowledge integration in decision making, but that the provided visual 
frame can also add complexity to the decision task or provide a perspective, which is not al-
ways beneficial. In practice, a facilitator should therefore realize when to change from one 
visual template to another, or when to stop using the visual tool altogether. There are moments 
in a meeting or there are entire meetings, where the use of a tool is counterproductive and in-
hibits what Gratton and Ghoshal call the trust-building or emotional ‘intimate exchanges’ 
(Gratton & Ghoshal, 2002).  
  66
 
Appendix 
Appendix 1: The Decision Maker Version of the Case Study 
The Pragmatic Development and Use of Know-how: Knowledge Management Light at 
Securitech Ltd. 
 
“Knowledge is not only a decisive competitive factor for research-intensive, multinational corporations, 
but also for a smaller, know-how-dependent firm such as ourselves, which is now expected to win mar-
ket share in supra-regional competition.”  Managing Director of Securitech Ltd. 
. 
A The Business Context 
Securitech Ltd. is a limited liability company headquartered in Zurich, which has been active in the areas of fire 
protection, break-in protection and corporate security for approximately 25 years. It was originally founded as an 
unincorporated company, and led by the company’s founder for approximately ten years, until he sold it to the 
management team, which helped to expand the company from around eight to, now, over ninety permanent em-
ployees. For fifteen years, a team of six managers has led the firm, although half of these had been with the 
company for less than five years. Of Securitech’s 95 employees, around 80 were directly involved in client pro-
jects. Securitech’s client portfolio is centred around medium-sized and large industrial companies throughout the 
greater Zurich area, as well as in the neighbouring regions. These required advice and products for security sys-
tems in warehouses, production sites and offices. The range of services offered by Securitech runs from the sim-
ple installation of a fire alarm system or a security system to the integrated planning of a company security con-
cept for crucial annex buildings or the handling of dangerous materials.  
 
Securitech is organised into three profit-centre like sectors, i.e. fire protection and prevention, break-in protec-
tion and alarm systems, as well as integrated corporate security. In terms of turnover, the two first sectors each 
accounted for approximately 40 percent of the total. The remaining 20 percent from corporate security consult-
ing, however, accounted for almost half of Securitech’s profit. For this reason, the company’s management had 
decided to more strongly accelerate growth in the area of integrated corporate security, not merely to continue as 
supplier and installer of security products, but to increasingly present itself as a competent corporate security 
consultant in the (supra-regional) market. A major obstacle in the pursuit of this strategy is, nevertheless, the 
relatively rigid profit-centre orientation of the majority of the employees, which is especially harmful to the 
sector-overreaching activities in the context of integrated corporate security. In addition Meyer, the technical 
director, had several times critically reflected on Securitech’s learning capacity to the management, and ironi-
cally noted that “we call experience what we have been doing wrong for the last ten years – we don’t really learn 
from our successes and failures.” Most members of project teams, according to Meyer, “rush from one project to 
the next without looking right or left.” 
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In addition to all this, it is just in the sector of integrated corporate security where the main know-how is concen-
trated in a few engineers, who are in great demand in the job market. Several departures of highly qualified em-
ployees in the past year hurt all three business sectors. One had the feeling that a large mass of project experi-
ence and technological knowledge has been lost in one go. At the same time, technological change is sweeping 
the security industry faster than ever before, and many employees expressed their difficulties in keeping up with 
the newest product developments (to say nothing of the reserve shown in the use of computers and related appli-
cations). On the client side, this occasionally leads to a lack of respect for the know-how of the Securitech secu-
rity consultants, probably also because Securitech finds it difficult to properly show and market their wide range 
of knowledge regarding security concepts and technologies. Facing these challenges, Securitech has developed 
the vision to be a knowledge-based, learning organisation that is active on a supra-regional level and deals with 
significantly more complex projects. 
 
*         *         * 
 
B The Five Proposed Knowledge Management Activities 
On the basis of this state of affairs, the managing director of Securitech decided that Furrer, an experienced pro-
ject-manager of Securitech who already had developed various knowledge management activities in his former 
job, should work out – together with an expert in the field of knowledge management - five light but specific 
knowledge management measures. Furrer and the external expert would then discuss these measures with the 
two responsible members of the management. Together, they would decide, which three of the five measures 
they should actually implement. The following five proposals are under discussion: 
 
1. Knowledge Architecture 
This project envisions the creation of a knowledge architecture of the areas of Securitech’s core competencies, 
for an improved positioning and marketing of the company’s knowledge for client acquisition, but also for the 
recruitment of new employees. The planned graphic illustration aims to show how the different competencies of 
Securitech worked in unison, and how they were distributed within the firm (which sector has which know-how).  
 
2. Know-how Organizational Chart 
The know-how organizational chart sets up a type of “knowledge shadow organisation” that aims to improve the 
network of competencies within Securitech and to overcome profit-centre-based thinking. In addition, this meas-
ure is intended to determine responsibilities for certain technology areas (“who is a specialist and contact person 
in what area and documents it accordingly.”). Additionally, this initiative is also intended to foster the concept of 
“communities of practice” within Securitech.  
 
3. Knowledge Fair 
The third proposed knowledge management measure consists of the organisation of a semi-annual knowledge 
fair with posters in the local cafeteria regarding important client projects, technologies and problems.  
 
4. The Knowledge-Cockpit 
  68
The forth proposed knowledge management measure is a regular gathering of a knowledge cockpit by means of 
various indicators, for the unitary assessment (and early warning) of the state of Securitech’s knowledge.  
 
5. The Learning Curve  
The learning curve project plans the organisation of regular lessons learned workshops for all large-project 
teams, to make the learning capital of the finished projects accessible to other employees. 
 
*         *         * 
C Your Assignment 
In a one hour meeting, Furrer and the external knowledge management expert have to present the five knowl-
edge management measures they have elaborated to two members of the management. Furrer and his expert 
already know that there is a lack of funding for all five initiatives and only three of them will be pursued further. 
At the end of this meeting, the three most convincing projects will be determined and the action steps to imple-
ment them will be decided.  
Imagine being part of this meeting: You take over the role of being a member of the management to whom the 
projects are presented. Your conversation partners are 1. another manager like you; 2. Furrer and; 3. the external 
knowledge management expert. During the one hour discussion you will complete the three assignments de-
scribed below. Furrer and the external expert can inform you on how the five knowledge measures look like. On 
the other hand, you have the feeling that they still lack some important corporate information, you should share 
with them. As final result of the one hour discussion, hand in the 4 evaluation criteria, and the 3 chosen projects.  
1. During the first 30 minutes, define four criteria by which you will evaluate the knowledge man-
agement measures. To do so, share with the two experts your information, insights and suppositions on 
the Securitech’s vision and objectives, but also on its internal and external problems and challenges. 
Remember, you as the mangers have deep insights into the corporate situation of Securitech (its struc-
ture, problems and objectives). Actively share this corporate information with the experts, since it is 
very important in order to decide with what criteria you will evaluate the knowledge management 
measures. Thus, in order to define the assessment criteria for the knowledge management measures, 
consider the overall situation of Securitech, but also of what you have learned until now on knowledge 
or project management either in class or through you previous internships or working experiences. 
2. During the next 30 minutes, discuss the five planned knowledge management measures, evaluate 
them and decide which three of the five you actually want to implement. Ask the experts to give 
you and overview on all five elaborated knowledge management measures, since you are informed on 
them on a very superficial level. Evaluate the proposed knowledge management measures on the basis 
of the four assessment criteria you have defined in the previous 30 minutes and decide which three you 
actually want to pursue further.  
  69
 
Appendix 2: The Expert Version of the Case Study 
The Pragmatic Development and Use of Know-how: Knowledge Management Light at 
Securitech Ltd. 
 
 “Knowledge is not only a decisive competitive factor for research-intensive, multinational corpora-
tions, but also for a smaller, know-how-dependent firm such as ourselves, which is now expected to win 
market share in supra-regional competition.”  Managing Director of Securitech Ltd. 
 
 
A The Business Context 
Securitech Ltd. is a company headquartered in Zurich, which has been trading in the areas of fire protection, 
break-in protection and corporate security for approximately 25 years. Securitech’s clients require advice and 
products for security systems in warehouses, production sites and offices. The range of services offered by Secu-
ritech runs from the simple installation of a fire alarm system or a security system to the integrated planning of a 
company security concept for crucial annex buildings or the handling of dangerous materials. In the last years, 
the security industry is experiencing a technological change that is faster than ever before, and many employees 
have difficulties in keeping up with the newest product developments. For fifteen years, a team of six managers 
has led the firm, although half of these had been with the company for less than five years. Securitech has 95 
employees and experienced quite a high employee turnover in the last years. Given the current situation, Securi-
tech aims to be a knowledge-based, learning organisation that deals with significantly more complex projects. 
*         *         * 
 
B The Five Proposed Knowledge Management Activities 
On the basis of this state of affairs, the managing director of Securitech decided that Furrer, an experienced pro-
ject-manager of Securitech who already had developed various knowledge management activities in his former 
job, should work out – together with an expert in the field of knowledge management - five light but specific 
knowledge management measures. Furrer and the external expert would then discuss these measures with the 
two responsible members of the management. Together, they would decide, which three of the five measures 
they should actually implement. The following five proposals are under discussion: 
 
1 Knowledge Architecture 
This project envisions the creation of a knowledge architecture of the areas of Securitech’s core competencies, 
for an improved positioning and marketing of the company’s knowledge for client acquisition, but also for the 
recruitment of new employees. The planned graphic illustration aims to show how the different competencies of 
Securitech worked in unison, and how they were distributed within the firm (which sector has which know-how).  
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1. Knowledge Architecture 
Logo: Benefit: Costs: 
The visual depiction of our core 
competencies and their interaction 
enables clients and new as well as 
potential employees to understand our 
know-how better. In addition, it will aid 
us in structuring the know-how 
organization chart (see 2). 
One-off  drafting by core team and 
graphic artist:           
approx. CHF 25,000 
Execution: 
 Will be prepared/reviewed max. once per year  
Target group: 
All (potential and current) employees and clients 
Process: 
1. Determination of our core competencies (integrated security planning, fire prevention, break-in protection, 
labour and production safety) during the next business management meeting with the participation of important 
experts (Frei, Sutter, Gerhardt) 
2. Working out of interdependent and sub-know how areas 
3. Presentation of competencies as an attractive map 
4. Printing of respective posters, flyers 
5. Notification of employees by superiors 
6. presentation of the map in recruitment and sales discussions 
7. Annual updating of the map as appropriate 
Documentation 
Posters and flyers will be filed in the L:/Knowledge/Architecture directory. 
Person(s) responsible: 
Anton Furrer 
Check: 
Measurement though poster distribution in canteen and presentation in every team. Use in sales situations. 
 
Furrer and the knowledge management expert plan to accommodate around twenty different sectors and sub-
sectors of know-how with some measure of clarity in a diagrammatic depiction. Based on this arrangement, the 
aim is to create practice groups. Furrer is convinced that such a diagram of the knowledge architecture would 
make a notable impression at client meetings or recruitment sessions and that clients and competitors assessed it 
as professional, innovative or maybe even enlightening (in part because it could create a common context 
whereby it is possible to orient oneself in conversations and meetings). Yet, one fear of Furrer is that nobody in 
the Securitech Ltd would have the technical skills to actually draw the diagram. For this reason, they probably 
would have to work with an informational graphics specialist. Next to the rather high costs of such a person, the 
problem would be that this person, after drafting the knowledge architecture, most likely would know more 
about the know-how of Securitech AG than many employees, but would then leave the company with all its 
acquired knowledge. 
 
2 Know-how Organizational Chart 
The know-how organizational chart sets up a type of “knowledge shadow organisation” that aims to improve the 
network of competencies within Securitech and to overcome profit-centre-based thinking. In addition, this meas-
ure has the aim to determine responsibilities for certain technology areas (“who is a specialist and contact person 
in what area and documents it accordingly.”). Additionally, this initiative is also intended to foster the concept of 
“communities of practice” within Securitech.  
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2. Know-how Organization Chart 
Logo: Benefit: Costs: 
Allocation of responsibility for specific 
technologies or processes to 
designated employees ensures a 
secure basis for the building up of 
knowledge. 
No quantifiable cash investment. Time 
investment of around 20 know-how 
area specialists: approx. 5 hours per 
week = approx. CHF 10,000 per week. 
(imputed costs) 
Execution: 
Securitech 
Know-how 
 
Regular screening of relevant trends as well as periodic briefings and reports to 
all employees by means of the employee newsletter or documents made 
accessible on the Server.  
Target group: 
Technology and process specialists of Securitech AG, as well as key account managers and project leaders. 
Process: 
1. Extracting approx. 20 know-how areas from our knowledge architecture 
2. Identification of relevant experts 
3. Allocation of tasks and responsibilities among the experts 
4. Experts organise practice groups and send initial orientation E-mail 
5. Experts set up area on server 
6. Five group leaders will present their area at the first knowledge fair (see point 3)  
Documentation 
The experts will set up their areas under L:/Knowledge/Groups. 
Person(s) responsible: 
Gregory Meyer: Head of production and technology 
Check: 
At least one technology report per know-how expert and year. At least two briefings to employees. At least two 
practice group meetings per year. Know-how-Organigram is available in the company presentation. Updates with 
Meyer. 
 
To draw up a knowledge structure and the relevant responsibilities would be relatively easily. However, Furrer’s 
biggest concern with this initiative is that the specific actions would depend heavily on the individual expert 
leader so that, at the end, no actions actually would take place. Because of this risk, Furrer and his knowledge 
management expert are not quite sure whether it would be better to identify the “hot topics” and build on existing 
informal groups, instead of insisting on practice groups.  
 
3 Knowledge Fair 
The third proposed knowledge management measure consists of the organisation of a semi-annual knowledge 
fair with posters in the local cafeteria regarding important client projects, technologies and problems.  
 
3. Knowledge Fair 
Logo: Benefit: Costs: 
Systematic and global knowledge 
transfer between the various project 
teams of all Securitech sectors. 
Hall rental: CHF 700 
Approx. 30 educational units: CHF 
40,000  
Other costs: CHF1,300. 
Total : approx. CHF 42,000 per year 
Execution: 
 1-2 times per year, in the form of a half-day event coupled with technical reports and case studies. 
Target group: 
All project leaders and project staff. 
Process: 
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1. Preparation of posters by  project teams to introduce their area of expertise 
2. Submission of  topics and clustering through Hurter => exhibition layout plan 
3. Set-up of booths by operations department, invitations per memo by Furrer 
4. Start: 8:30 am, two technical reports and subsequent holding of fair until 1:00 pm 
5. Individual informational briefings in booths the whole morning. Short presentations in booths possible 
6. Report on fair in employee newsletter by Hurter  
Documentation 
The posters of the project teams will be filed under L:/KnowledgeFair/ Year/Poster. The two introductory reports 
will be filed under L:/KnowledgeFair/Year/Reports. 
Person(s) responsible: 
Hans Hurter: assistant / project management support. 
Check: 
At least one general company meeting per year with attendance by at least 70 percent of project staff.  At least 
one partial meeting with attendance by at least 40 percent of project staff. 
Crucial for the success of the knowledge fair is the committed participation of the employees. For this reason, 
one of the challenging questions of this measure is how to ensure that all project teams actually produce a poster, 
that at least 70 percent of the project staff takes part in the knowledge fair and that the feedback questionnaire is 
completed by about two thirds of the participants. To have the necessary commitment of the employees, it is 
crucial that this measure would be well communicated. Furrer therefore thinks to create logos not only for this 
particular measure, but for all the knowledge management initiatives they will implement. Another important 
issue is also of how to organize the fair so that it becomes an event that not only is a tool to invite people to share 
their project experiences, but also increases the identification with Securitech as an organization and motivates 
the employees in their daily work. 
 
4 The Knowledge-Cockpit 
The forth proposed knowledge management measure is a regular gathering of a knowledge cockpit by means of 
various indicators, for the unitary assessment (and early warning) of the state of Securitech’s knowledge.  
 
4. Knowledge-Cockpit 
Logo: Benefit: Costs: 
Periodic success and risk vetting 
through a core set of meaningful 
indicators of knowledge increase and 
decrease, respectively knowledge 
use/development, at Securitech. 
Data collection costs: 4 hours per 
department semi-annually: approx. CHF 
15,000 
Execution: 
 
Semi-annually through all levels (from teams through departments and whole-
business) 
Target group: 
All project leaders and project staff. 
Process: 
1. Identification of critical knowledge areas (= target-determining) 
2. Compiling indicators – modelled on ‘balanced scorecard’ – in business management meeting  
3. Initial collection of  indicator data and linking to Cockpit 
4. Periodic data collection and analysis 
5. Fine tuning and annual comparisons as the occasion arises 
Documentation 
Indicators will be maintained in the access database. 
Person(s) responsible: 
Max Baumer (CFO) 
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Check: 
At least one semi-annual run with 8 indicators from the areas of technology-know-how, client knowledge, 
profitability and processes.  
 
When Furrer elaborated the proposal for this measure, he found it quite challenging to develop an adequate set of 
indicators. Too few indicators would not cover the various aspects, fields and uses of knowledge. On the other 
hand, too many indicators would be difficult to manage. Also, since the employees would be responsible for the 
data collection in their sector, Furrer fears that it would mean to ask them too much effort for this particular 
initiative. Therefore, the biggest challenge to implement this measure successfully probably is to develop a 
clever system of manageable indicators that might be structured along two dimensions. Two possible dimensions 
could be innovation and efficiency. The three indicators in the area of innovation could then be the so-called 
rookie ratio (the percentage of new employees, who had been with the company for less than one year), the new 
client ratio (percentage of new clients) and the new product ratio (percentage of new products on offer, i.e. which 
have been available for less than six months). The indicators in the area of efficiency could be the winning ratio 
(number of won clients in relation to submitted offers), the training ratio (number of diplomas received per pro-
fessional examination taken) and the consulting ratio (percentage of consulting projects). 
 
5 The Learning Curve  
The learning curve project plans the organisation of regular lessons learned workshops for all large-project 
teams, to make the learning capital of the finished projects accessible to other employees. 
5. Learning Curve 
Logo: Benefit: Costs: 
This systematic milestone-analysis will 
help the team to avoid repeating 
mistakes, improve processes and 
reduce unnecessary work/expenditure, 
as well as preserving important findings 
for the future. 
Team meeting room, meta-planning 
tools and room. 
=> Approx. 3 half-day workshops per 
year and team: no quantifiable cash 
costs, imputed costs approx. CHF 
80,000 (to be charged to project 
budget) 
Execution: 
 
 
 
Approx. three times per year as a half-day event with presenter from another 
project group. 
Target group: 
All project leaders and project staff. 
Process: 
1. Stakeholder analysis of the project  
2. Survey of the most common questions, mistakes, successes, experiences with external contractors etc. 
3. Process review (what went well, what didn’t work => findings and actualisation) 
4. Plan of measures to be taken 
5. Looking forward 
6. Documentation saved on L server 
Documentation 
The metaplan working papers of the project teams will be filed under the path name L:/Knowledge/Learningcurve. 
Where projects have been completed, a short case study will be produced and filed in the same directory. 
Person(s) responsible: 
Large-project leaders. Project management support Hans Hurter 
Check: 
At least one completely documented learning curve workshop per year / large-project team. 
 
Furrer and the knowledge management expert are quite confident that this project would become a success. What 
they still do not have clearly in mind is the way how they want to document the ‘lessons learned’. A very handy 
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appraisal format would be determinant whether people who did not assist the workshops could actually learn 
from the lesson.  
*         *         * 
C Your Assignment 
In a one hour meeting, Furrer and the external knowledge management expert have to present the five knowl-
edge management measures they have elaborated to two members of the management. Furrer and his expert 
already know that there is a lack of funding for all five initiatives and only three of them will be pursued further. 
At the end of this meeting, the three most convincing projects will be determined and the action steps to imple-
ment them will be decided.  
Imagine being part of this meeting: You will take over the role of either Furrer or the knowledge management 
expert. You will talk to two managers of Securitech Ltd., who only have a very limited knowledge on your ini-
tiatives. You as the experts are the ones who have deep insights on how the five knowledge measures look like. 
On the other hand, while you were elaborating the five knowledge management measures, you realised that you 
still lack some important corporate information. The mangers can provide you with that information. During the 
one hour discussion you will complete the two assignments described below. As a final result of the one hour 
discussion, hand in the 4 evaluation criteria, and the 3 chosen projects. 
 
3. During the first 30 minutes, define four criteria by which you will evaluate the knowledge manage-
ment measures. To do so, share with the two managers your information, insights and suppositions on 
the Securitech’s vision and objectives, but also on its internal and external problems and challenges. 
Since you still lack some important information on these corporate issues, actively ask the managers to 
give you more insights on the specifics, problems and goals of Securitech. This information is important 
in order to decide with what criteria you will evaluate the knowledge management measures. Thus, in 
order to define the assessment criteria for the knowledge management measures consider the overall 
situation of Securitech, but also of what you have learned until now on knowledge or project manage-
ment either in class or through you previous internships or working experiences.  
4. During the next 30 minutes, discuss the five planned knowledge management measures and evalu-
ate them so that the two managers can decide which three of the five to actually implement. Give the 
managers an overview on all five elaborated knowledge management measures. Remember, you as the 
experts have spent a lot of time developing these measures and know much more on the issue. You can 
contribute valuable insights and suggestions, but the decisions, which ones to pursue further are then 
taken by the two managers. For the evaluation of the measures, use the four assessment criteria you 
have defined in the previous 30 minutes. Let the two managers decide, which three knowledge man-
agement measures to pursue further. 
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Appendix 3: The Information Cues of the Expert and Decision Maker Ver-
sions of the Case Study 
Information Cues Expert Decision Maker 
Corporate Information Cues   
General   
• medium sized company (90 employees) x x 
• new management team  x 
Organizational Structure:   
• profit center: fire (40%), break in (40%), corp. Sec (20%)  x 
Strategy:   
• grow in corporate security segment  x 
• enlarge action scope from regional to supra-regional level  x 
• establish vision to be a knowledge-based, learning organization that deals with 
significantly more complex projects. 
x x 
Problems and Challenges:   
• learn few from past experiences (successes / failures)  x 
• knowledge concentration in a few employees particularly in the corporate secu-
rity business 
 x 
• knowledge amnesia due to employee turnover (x) x 
• profit center orientation -> particularly problematic for corporate security busi-
ness 
 x 
• poor marketing of expertise -> poor valuing of expertise on client side  x 
• keeping up with fast technological change and quick product development x x 
Project Information Cues   
Knowledge Architecture   
Logo x  
Benefits:    
• improved positioning and marketing of the Securitech’s knowledge for client ac-
quisition, but also for the recruitment of new employees 
x x 
• practice groups elaborating knowledge areas -> sensitization, coming together (x)  
Drawbacks:   
• don't have skills within Securitech x  
• hire expensive external person    
• loose knowledge when that external person has finished the job   
Cost: CHF 25'000 x  
Target: all employees   
Linkage to Other Initiatives: know-how org chart x  
Implementation Process x  
Documentation   x  
Person Responsible x  
Output/Year: posters with graphical representation of knowledge architecture (elec-
tronic, physical) 
x (x) 
Know-how Organizational Chart   
Logo x  
Benefits:    
• improve the network of competencies within Securitech and overcome profit-
centre-based thinking 
x x 
• determine responsibilities for certain technology areas x x 
• foster the concept of “communities of practice” and building a knowledge base x x 
Drawbacks:   
• specific actions would depend heavily on the individual expert leader so that, at 
the end, no actions actually would take place 
x  
Cost: CHF 10,000 per week (work hours) x  
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Information Cues Expert Decision Maker 
Target: Technology and process specialists, key account managers and project 
leaders 
x  
Linkage to Other Initiatives: (knowledge architecture) x  
Implementation Process x  
Documentation   x  
Person Responsible x  
Output/Year: A knowledge shadow organization. Regular screening of relevant 
trends as well as periodic briefings and reports to all employees by means of the 
employee newsletter or documents made accessible on the Server.  
x (x) 
Knowledge Fair   
Logo x  
Benefits:    
• Systematic and global knowledge transfer between the various project teams x  
Drawbacks:   
commitment of the employees -> good communication needed x  
Cost: CHF 42,000  x  
Target: All project leaders and project staff x  
Implementation Process x  
Documentation   x  
Person Responsible x  
Output/Year: semi-annual knowledge fair with posters in the local cafeteria regard-
ing important client projects, technologies and problems 
x x 
Knowledge-Cockpit   
Logo x  
Benefits:    
Periodic success and risk vetting through a core set of meaningful indicators of 
knowledge increase and decrease, respectively knowledge use/development 
x  
Drawbacks:   
• develop an adequate set of indicators x  
• much effort asked from staff x  
Cost: CHF 15,000  x  
Target: All project leaders and project staff x  
Process x  
Documentation   x  
Person Responsible x  
Output/Year: set of meaningful indicators of knowledge increase and decrease, 
respectively knowledge use/development 
x x 
Learning Curve    
Logo x  
Benefits:    
• make the learning capital of the finished projects accessible to other employees x x 
Drawbacks:   
• documentation of lessons learned x  
Cost: CHF 80,000  x  
Target: All project leaders and project staff x x 
Process x  
Documentation   x  
Person Responsible x  
Output/Year: regular lessons learned workshop (3xyear) x x 
 
Notes:  
x: information cue is fully and clearly available to the person with the specific role 
(x): information is cue only indirectly and less explicitly available to the person with the specific role 
text: information cue that is completely unimportant for the decision making process 
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Appendix 4: Overview on let’s focus suite 
The let’s focus Timeliner is a tool that is thought to systematically structure conversa-
tions that aim at planning, documenting or reviewing processes. It contains four parallel time 
lines which can vary in their size and description. These streams can be structured into daily, 
weekly or monthly segments, and then filled with activities and events (let's-focus, 2006). Is 
suited for planning tasks (DeSanctis, 1987).  
The let’s focus Ruler supports tasks, in which teams or individuals have to undertake 
and compare evaluations along several dimensions (e.g. client- or competitor evaluations). The 
ruler makes it possible to discuss and take into consideration over forty decision variables 
concurrently. In this stance, the tool can also be used to develop scenarios or strategies. (let's-
focus, 2006).  
The let’s focus Tracker supports the planning, moderation, and real-time documenta-
tion of workshops or meetings. Through the tool, participants can visualize the meeting goals 
and the agenda steps that are needed to achieve them. Main contributions of the meeting or 
workshop can be positioned along the track. The main idea behind the let’s focus Tracker is to 
graphically depict the course of the current meeting. In this way, meetings can be better struc-
tured and it can be easily uncovered if a conversation digresses into side tracks. At the end of a 
meeting, the completed track can serve as synthetic minutes. Contrary to the other tools of the 
let’s focus suite, the let’s focus Tracker is not bound to a specific task, but can be an instru-
ment to structure the communication process of all sorts of meetings (let's-focus, 2006). 
The particularity of the let’s focus Positioner is a large library of interactive and in part 
animated templates of diagrams and visual metaphors that a user can load as a background and 
use as a loose or more strict structuring device on which to position his/her content. As the 
Positioner is the tool with which we conducted the experiment,  
Appendix 5 shows all the functionalities of the tool. 
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Appendix 5: Functionalities of the let’s focus Positioner 2.1 
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In the following, we describe the functionalities of let’s focus Positioner and discuss briefly their intention and 
supposed use. 
 
Select a Background 
A distinguishing feature of let’s focus Positioner is that its user (e.g. the moderator of a meeting) can 
choose between a variety of backgrounds. These are either diagrams (i.e. Ishikawa, Balanced Scorecard, Five 
Forces, Expert Web, Value Chain, or Ansoff Matrix) or visual metaphors (i.e. a radar, an iceberg, a bridge, geo-
graphical maps, a ladder, a pyramid, a wheel, or a funnel), some of which are discretely animated. Users can also 
load personal backgrounds (e.g. photographs). Users are free to choose whether they would like to use just one 
image or diagram for the whole conversation or whether they would like to work with two or three visuals that 
support specific phases of the conversation process. The suggestion is that a trained facilitator would realize 
when a group is stuck in a certain approach and could propose a different image 
The idea is that the individual or group selects a visual guideline or cognitive and communicative frame 
with which to approach and structure an issue or conversation. The frame is cognitive in so far as it shapes the 
way people view and structure a problem or task. These diagrams and metaphors comprehend also a communica-
tive aspect since they provide a common ground and language to all the participants of a conversation. By pro-
viding content-specific visualizations and structuring methods (as opposed to content-unspecific visualization 
like a simple mapping technique) (Fischer et al., 2002), the tool facilitates collaborative processes and outcomes.  
 
Select a (Pre-configured) Template  
let’s focus Positioner provides a set of prefabricated templates to structure a meeting that aims, for ex-
ample, at a stakeholder analysis, or at the evaluation of an merger. The templates combine a background image 
(diagram, visual metaphor) with some default text-fields and objects. The idea is similar to the one of the back-
ground functionality. In this case, however, the provided structure is more tightly guiding.  
 
Place Objects 
Users can drag and drop objects that have the form of a circle or of a square with a textbox next to them. 
Each (important) contribution and thought can be documented as an object. The color and size of both object and 
text can be changed.  
 
Place Text Fields 
Users can place textboxes that have no adjacent object to them. Visually, they can be used for aspects, 
which do not represent a major “point” or statement in the discussion. For example, they can be used as descrip-
tions for the various parts of the diagrams and metaphors. 
 
Place Arrows 
Users can draw arrows that show the interrelationships (causalities, flows, developments, origins, etc.) 
between various objects.  
 
Place Icons 
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Users can select from a large array of icons (flash, target, bulb, bomb, green/red traffic lights, etc.) and 
place them next to textboxes or objects. In this way, they can emphasize a certain aspect and give it a visual 
indication of the type of information that is displayed (e.g. “idea”, “danger”). 
 
Delete 
Users can put objects, text fields, icons, arrows, etc. in the trashcan by dragging the elements over the 
trashcan. It is not possible to delete the objects by pressing the delete key. The developers believe that, from a 
communicative perspective, it is important to actually throw an idea away and not simply to make it disappear by 
the push of the button, as if it had never existed.  
 
Board  
The board is the space on the left hand side of the software window. Users have the possibility to de-
posit an idea or aspect in this area. It can be used as a “parking lot”, on which people can park an aspect and 
come back later on, in order to first finish the current argument. Also, it can be used to deposit aspects, of which 
conversers do not know where to put them along the diagram or metaphor.  
 
Comments  
The users of the let’s focus Positioner have the possibility to deposit comments. They can use the com-
ments to document why they have positioned a certain aspect or issue at a certain level of the diagram or meta-
phor, what are the facts behind a specific evaluation, or what are the caveats behind a certain consensus. In that 
comment field, users can also add a specific URL or a link to a document (e.g. an Excell sheet) for further in-
formation or facts.  
While the main interface of the Positioner aims to show the major (discussion) points and decisions 
made on an all-integrating visual, the comments give the groups or individuals the possibility to provide more 
detailed and background information. The user can show or print all the comments that appear as pop-up boxes 
and which outline the more detailed information (e.g. facts, reasons why). If the person is interested merely in a 
summary, he/she can also hide the comments so that only the high level information is visible. The producers 
believe it to be important to make it possible to “scale” information, i.e. to document and retrieve information at 
various levels of detail and to easily link the summary view to the more detailed information.   
 
Print 
At any stage of the conversation, users can print out the Positioner interface and view intermediate or 
final results on paper. Producers believe that the print-out functionality comprises various important functions. 
First, the change in the output media allows for subtle changes in fluidity and flexibility as they are perceived by 
the conversation partners. While the electronic media suggests that the documentation of the conversation is 
highly flexible and can be very easily changed, the cold print on paper implies more stability and participants can 
‘freeze’ the intermediary results of a conversation and sense a feeling of security and progress. The printed me-
dia suggests that official decisions have been taken (Mengis & Eppler, 2005b). Second, with the printouts at 
hand, conversers can conduct comparisons more easily since screen sizes have tight limits in juxtaposing various 
Positioner interfaces simultaneously. In the case of a client assessment meeting, for example, conversers can use 
the Positioner to structure the assessment of each client. The print-out function makes it then possible to compare 
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the various client assessments. Finally, the media change from the electronic to the physical media is also impor-
tant to include haptic and tactile senses that foster innovation and knowledge creation (Hatwell et al., 2003).  
 
Save 
Users can save the Positioner document.  
 
Make a Screenshot 
Users can make a screenshot of (preliminary) results or of the current state of their discussion/thinking. 
The function of the Screenshot is necessary to include the let’s focus Positioner document in textfiles, presenta-
tions, etc. In addition, similar to the print-out function, it serves to “freeze” a (preliminary) result of a conversa-
tion and to create a sense of stability and accountability.  
 
Compare two Screenshots  
Users have the possibility to make comparisons with a previously made screenshot. They can, for ex-
ample, use one template to assess a past situation, make a screenshot, then make an assessment of the current 
situation, and then load the previously made screenshot. The screenshot will appear semi-transparently so that 
the image of the assessment of the present is overlapping the one of the past. In this way, comparisons between 
two time periods or between two clients, objects, etc. are possible.  
 
Change Size of Objects and Fonts 
With the size ruler, users can change the size of objects, icons, and fonts.   
 
Change Color of Objects and Fonts 
With the color palette, users can change the color of text fields, objects, and arrows.  
 
Clear 
Users can clear all objects, text fields, icons, arrows, etc., which are placed on the Positioner so that 
only the initial background image remains.  
 
Sign 
Users can document the author and the day of the file and give a brief description of its content. 
 
Undo 
Users can undo any action they have done (placing objects, selecting backgrounds, etc.). 
 
Languages 
User can switch between a German, English, Italian, and a French version of the software. 
 
Replay Function / Pause / Fast Forward / Stop 
The replay function permits users to review the process, through which the final image, e.g. the result of 
a discussion, has been created. One can envision the whole process (from the initial template/background to the 
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final image) through which the group went through. Objects and textboxes will pop-up one after the other. The 
idea behind this functionality is that often, people forget or have never known (since they have not been present) 
how or why a certain conclusion or agreement has come about. This feature permits persistence i.e. traceability 
(Bregman & Haythornthwaite, 2001) in the process of the conversation. One can see, for example, that a certain 
concept was renamed or first positioned at another level of the diagram. As in a video or audio recorder, the 
replay of the development process of a Positioner image can be paused or stopped and users have the possibility 
to do a fast forward.  
 
Delete Replay Function 
The recording of the process through which the image got developed can be deleted. This functionality 
is interesting for example when one creates a template and isn’t interested in the process that lead to the creation 
of the template, but rather on the processes of the following interactions.  
 
Import  
Users can import Excell-sheets or another positioner document.  
 
Export  
The software provides the functionality to export a Positioner document as excell-file (to further use the 
text within the various categories) or as .jpg picture.  
 
Help 
let’s focus Positioner has a small help function, which includes also a guided tour and that explains how 
to use the software.  
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Appendix 6: Distribution of Items - Tests of Normality 
 
Factor Item Mean Standard Deviation 
Skewness 
(St.Error) 
Kurtosis 
(St.Error) 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (sig.) 
Shapiro-Wilk 
(sig.) 
 EP 1.  .6875 .73193 1.822 (.299) 6.470 (.590) .288 (.000) .678 (.000) 
 2.     2.3214 .86297  -.330 (.441)  -.939 (.858) .284 (.000) .831 (.000) 
 3.  .7656 .92139 1.245 (.299)   .895 (.590) .266 (.000) .744 (.000) 
BP 1.    1.2813 .89918 1.433 (.299) 2.510 (.590) .373 (.000) .748 (.000) 
 2.    1.6094 1.09279   .464 (.299)  -.352 (.590) .272 (.000) .899 (.000) 
 3.    1.5000 .85449   .394 (.299)  -.561 (.590) .299 (.000) .841 (.000) 
 4.   1.2295  .58860    .418 (.306)   .637 (.604) .373 (.000) .751 (.000) 
 5.  .8594 .75313   .700 (.299)   .488 (.590) .341 (.000) .698 (.000) 
 6. .8906 .66945 1.439 (.299) 6.456 (.590) .270 (.000) .809 (.000) 
CG 1.  .9531 .57541   .511 (.299) 2.241 (.590) .361 (.000) .714 (.000) 
 2.  .9531 .69988   .638 (.299) 1.006 (.590) .317 (.000) .791 (.000) 
CC 1.    1.4688 .61641   .122 (.299)  -.236 (.590) .308 (.000) .780 (.000) 
 2.    1.3750 .70147  -.392 (.299)  -.484 (.590) .282 (.000) .807 (.000) 
 3.    1.3906 .76878   .272 (.299)  -.168 (.590) .288 (.000) .847 (.000) 
RC 1.  .3015 .63842 5.488 (.302) 2.331 (.595) .459 (.000) .536 (.000) 
 2.  .4688 .90797 2.197 (.299) 4.513 (.595) .416 (.000) .584(.000) 
 3.  .3750 .65465 1.883 (.299) 3.656 (.595) .420 (.000) .616 (.000) 
DC 1. .9219 .62500   .456 (.299) 1.225 (.595) .331 (.000) .762 (.000) 
SGP 1.  .7969 .73850 1.565 (.299) 5.283 (.595) .314 (.000) .714 (.000) 
 2.  .8906 .73716 1.404 (.299) 4.630 (.595) .332 (.000) .734 (.000) 
Notes: The tests of normality of distribution illustrate that several variables show considerable skew-
ness and/or kurtosis. In most cases, many of the skewness values are even more than twice the value of 
the standard error. By a frequent standard error of 0.299 of the skewness, the skewness itself ranges 
from 0.122 (“How many disagreements regarding different ideas were there during the one hour discus-
sion?”) up to 5.49 (“How much anger was there among the members of the group?”). In the non-tool 
condition, skewness is even more positive. In addition, some of the variables have quite kurtose distri-
butions (which ranges from -0.037 for “I shared with my group members all the relevant insights, in-
formation, experiences that I deemed relevant for the task” to 6.456 for “At every point in time I knew 
why the group was discussing a specific issue.”). Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests of nor-
mality confirm the fact that variables show a non-normal distribution. Unfortunately, treating the vari-
ables with a logarithm did not improve the situation significantly. As a general tendency, respondents 
reported quite positively (or uncritically) on their or the groups behaviour. One possible explanation for 
the non-normality of our distributions is our small sample size (Yourstone & Zimmer, 1992). An addi-
tional explanation for the non-normality could also be that students were only poorly motivated to re-
flect critically on the questions of the questionnaire after having participated in the relatively long ex-
periment of one hour. Furthermore, biases of social desirability (Edwards, 1990) or of acquiescence 
(Hurd, 1999; Paulhaus, 1991) might also be reasons for the non-normal distributions we found. The 
subjective impressions of the researchers, who attended the experiments as observers and who organ-
ized the correct filling out of the questionnaires, found that for constructs, that are quite easily observ-
able like equal participations, the turn taking was not as balanced as respondents reported and that there 
was a difference between the respondents’ exposed theories (written or oral self-descriptions of 
one’s/an organization’s behaviour, values, beliefs) and the ones in use (those more implicit values, be-
liefs, and assumptions manifested in personal/organizational practice) (Argyris & Schön, 1978). 
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Appendix 7: Original Scales with Factor Loadings and Cronbach Alphas 
Prior to Scale Adjustments 
Factor Item Factor Loading  
Eigen- 
value 
% of vari-
ance ex-
plained 
Chron-
bach alpha 
Equal Participa-
tion (EP) 
1 There were not one or two people who 
dominated the discussion 0.874 
 2. There was an adequate participation from 
all members of the group. 0.814 
 3. The other members of my group paid 
attention to the comments I made. 0.586 
1.77 0.59 0.65 
Big Picture (BP) 1. The conversation process was very clear 0.806 
 2. We never lost time on discussing irrele-
vant issues 0.724 
 3. We never lost time on too detailed discus-
sions 0.602 
 4. I always knew how a specific contribution 
related to the more general topic of the 
discussion. 
0.603 
 5. At every point in time I knew why the 
group was discussing a specific issue. 0.774 
 6. I knew at every point in time where we 
where in the discussion 0.632 
2.90 0.48 0.78 
Common Ground 
(CG) 
1. During the discussion the group created a 
shared and deep understanding of the 
topic. 
0.829 
 2. During the conversation, the group devel-
oped and shared a common language to 
deal with the task 
0.854 
 3. I could now better adjust my communica-
tion style to the other members of the 
group. 
0.492 
1.66 0.55 0.55 
Task Conflict (TC) 1. How many disagreements regarding 
different ideas were there during the one 
hour discussion? 
0.838 
 2. How many differences about the content 
of decisions did the group have to work 
through? 
0.749 
 3. How many differences of opinion were 
there within the group? 0.837 
1.96 0.65 0.73 
Relationship 
Conflict (RC) 
1. How much anger was there among the 
members of the group? 0.854 
 2. How much tension was there in the group 
during the exercise? 0.898 
 3. How much personal friction was there in 
the group during decisions? 0.901 
2.35 0.78 0.85 
Decision Com-
mitment (DC) 
1. I feel confident that our group made the 
right decisions 0.709 
 2. The group was better at making the deci-
sion than I could have done by myself. 0.674 
 3. The decisions were unanimous (that is, all 
four of us agreed) before the two managers 
of my group took a decision. 
0.424 
 4. There was a lot of agreement in the group. 0.730 
1.669 41.7 0.48 
Satisfaction with 
Group 
1. I am satisfied with my group's set of solu-
tions 0.881 
Performance 
(SGP) 
2. I am satisfied with my group's perform-
ance 0.735 
 3. I am satisfied with my performance on this 
assignment. 0.650 
1.74 0.58 0.63 
Notes: Items reported in grey are the ones we had to drop 
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Appendix 8: Group Comparison of Means between Tool- and Non-Tool-
Condition 
Construct Non-Tool Condition 
Mean (S.D.) 
Tool Condition 
Mean (S.D) 
d t2 p 
Equal Participation 0.89 (0.73) 1.19 (0.94) -.30 -1.41 .165 n.s. 
Big Picture 0.99 (0.30) 1.46 (0.67) -.47 -3.53 .001** 
Common Ground 0.84 (0.50) 1.06 (0.61) -.22 -1.58 .120 n.s. 
Task Conflict 2.55 (0.57) 2.63 (0.57) -.07 -.52 .608 n.s. 
Relationship Conflict 3.52 (0.76) 3.71 (0.53) -.19 -1.16 .250 n.s. 
Decision Commit-
ment 0.90 (0.64) 0.94 (0.62) -.03 -.20 .843 n.s. 
Table 4:  Group Comparison of Means between Tool- and Non-Tool-Condition 
Notes: SD = standard deviation, d = effect size, t2 = t-test, p = p-value  
** Significance at .01 level, * Significance at .05 level 
The means comparison between the tool and non-tool condition shows significant means differ-
ences only with regard to the “big picture” construct. The mean is significantly higher in the tool 
condition (mean: 1.46 (S.D.: 0.67) than in the unsupported condition (mean: 0.99 (S.D.: 0.30). The 
individuals in the non-tool groups struggled less to gain the big picture and they were more satis-
fied with their performance than the individuals interacting with the facilitation of the tool. Al-
though we have not expected that the tool has a significant positive impact on the level of the 
means, the significant negative effect for the big picture construct can be explained by a low fa-
miliarity with the tool and the use of an inexperienced moderator (person using the tool). Both as-
pects led to breaks in the communication flow, an exaggerate time allocation for the documentation 
of details, and an unbalanced participation (see discussion of open-ended qualitative questions, 
Table 2).  
 
Appendix 9: Pearson's Inter-Construct Correlations Controlling for the 
Tool/Non-Tool Condition 
 EP 
no-tool/tool 
BP 
no-tool/tool 
CG 
no-tool/tool 
TC 
no-tool/tool 
RC 
no-tool/tool 
DC 
no-tool/tool 
Equal Participation 
(EP)       
Big Picture (BP) .37*/.49**      
Common Ground 
(CG) .18/.35* .20/.54**     
Task Conflict (TC) -.57**/-.24 -.31/-.10 -.10/.24    
Relationship Con-
flict (RC) -.55**/-.33 -.50**/-.47** -.18/-.60** .50**/.05   
Decision Commit-
ment (DC) .28/.27 .37*/.52** -.10/.31 -.51**/-.22 -.35/-.26  
 
Notes: ** Significance at .01 level, * Significance at .05 level 
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